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ABSTRACT 
The United Kingdom’s Civil Aviation Authority published the national aviation 
forecast in 2008. The forecast predicts that domestic traffic will increase by 
3.5% per year, and that international traffic will grow, on average, by 4.5% 
during 2010-2020. Based on this prediction, the traffic density will increase 
dramatically in the future, and airspace will be more and more congested. 
Usually, there are two potential solutions to deal with this situation: improving 
the ability of air traffic flow management is one solution; reducing the separation 
minimum of aircraft is another solution. However, this thesis focuses on the 
second solution, based on constraints of communication, navigation and 
surveillance systems (CNS). The separation minimum evaluation procedure can 
be divided into four steps: firstly, models or parameters are developed to 
describe the performance of CNS, such as navigation accuracy, communication 
transaction time and surveillance delay time; secondly, a Kalman filter 
prediction architecture, based on the CNS performance parameters, is built to 
improve the performance of aircraft’s position estimation; then, a Reich model is 
used to evaluate the collision risk probability of parallel air route separation 
minimum; finally, the collision risk probability is compared to target level of 
safety (TLS) of 
95 10  to ascertain whether the separation minimum can satisfy 
safety requirements or not. 
On the basis of the above models, the air route separation minimum 
assessment has been completed. The results indicate that the method 
proposed in this thesis provides a feasible method for safety assessment of 
parallel route separation minimum. 
Keywords: Safety Assessment, CNS Systems, Kalman Filter, Separation 
Minimum, Target Level of Safety. 
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1 Introduction 
In the past decades, the civil aviation industry has developed rapidly. According 
to the United Kingdom’s Civil Aviation Authority report, the number of 
passengers who took flights at UK airports was 112 million in 1994 [1]. As 
Figure 1-1 shows, although there was a large decrease of passengers travelling 
by plane at UK airports between 2002 and 2003, the passengers had a 4% 
year-on-year increase between 1994 and 2007. A large number of aircraft are 
needed to meet the growth in air passengers, so the air space gets congested. 
As a consequence, airline delays become worse; for example, Heathrow airport 
has the worst delays in Europe, with passengers usually experiencing a delay of 
half an hour, and it is also implied in Figure 1.2 that 1/4 of flights in Europe are 
not on time, and the average delay is about 30-40 minutes [1]. 
 
Figure 1-1 Passengers Growth [1] 
The civil aviation industry will continue to increase in the future. The United 
Kingdom’s Civil Aviation Authority published the national aviation forecast in 
2008. The forecast shows a prediction that domestic traffic will increase 3.5% 
per year and international traffic will grow, on average, by 4.5% during 2010-
2020 [1]. Based on this prediction, the traffic density will increase dramatically in 
the future, and airspace will be more and more congested. 
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Figure 1-2 Airline Delay Rates [1] 
As described, congestion of air space will become worse, and as a 
consequence, customers may suffer longer delays in the future. The main 
reasons contributing to the airline delay are shown as follows [1] - [2]: 
 Congestion of airspace;  
 Inefficient way to use airspace; 
 Low inefficient ATM; 
 Low ability of CNS; 
 Low capacity of airport. 
In order to ease the air congestion, International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) introduced a new system, named as Communication, Navigation, 
Surveillance / Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) systems, which depended on 
the technologies in computers, satellites, advanced avionics and data links [2]. 
Based on the constraints of CNS systems, this thesis discusses the method, 
used to reduce the separation minimum to ease the air congestion. 
1.1 Project Background 
In the current ATC system, there are two types of instrument flight procedure as 
shown in Figure 1.3. The first one is ground-based radio navigation aids air 
route, shown in Figure 1.3a. In this architecture, many navigation aids are built 
along air routes. Aircraft must pass navigation aids one by one. This procedure 
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is being widely used nowadays, but has some significant disadvantages. Firstly, 
many navigation aids and air traffic control units should be built along air routes. 
Because of limited working range of the navigation aids, this air route 
architecture uses a small portion of airspace and the airspace can not be 
expanded. Some areas along the air route, such as mountains and oceanic 
areas are hard to build navigation aids on, so this air route architecture usually 
has longer flight distance than the optimum air route. Secondly, an aircraft’s 
position estimation errors depend on the range between aircraft and navigation 
aids - the longer the range, the bigger the error. The second instrument flight 
procedure, shown in Figure 1.3b, is performance-based RNAV/RNP procedure. 
In this architecture, satellite navigation methods, such as GPS, which have 
world wide coverage, are selected. Therefore, the pilot can choose the optimum 
air route to follow, which results in shorter flight distance, lower fuel-cost and 
lower possibility of delay. Meanwhile, the separation minimum between aircraft 
of RNAV/RNP air route is smaller than that of the ground aids air route [3]. 
  
(a)                                                         (b) 
Figure 1-3 Instrument Flight Procedure 
Conventional Route, (b) Performance-based RNP Route [3] 
In order to evaluate the separation minimum collision risk probability to satisfy 
the target level of safety (TLS) of 
95 10 , Reich provided a model to evaluate 
safety issues of long range air traffic routes ([4]-[6]), and then this model was 
named as the Reich model and had a wide effect on the separation minimum 
estimation, which can be seen in the ICAO DOC 9426 [7]. In the Reich model, 
factors such as traffic density and navigation performance are considered. In 
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1977 and 1978, Brooker and Penna used the Reich model to evaluate the 
longitudinal separation of North Atlantic Air Traffic ([8]-[9]). Moek used the Reich 
model to conduct risk assessment of RNP 10 and RVSM in the South Atlantic 
Flight Identification Regions, and eventually the lateral separation was reduced 
from 100 NMI to 50 NMI after the air route was deployed the RNP 10 navigation 
ability [10]. In 2010, Zhang used the Reich model to estimate the collision risk in 
cross air routes in Shanghai areas in China, and the results showed that the 
separation minimum could satisfy the requirement of TLS ([10]-[13]. Radar 
surveillance sensor errors, including PSR and SSR sensor errors, have been 
carefully analysed [14]. The position errors and display errors have been 
evaluated in the activity. In 1995, Rockman developed a simple model to 
describe the radar separation minimum. 3 NMI separation minimum has been 
analysed, based on several factors such as surveillance position accuracy, 
radar antenna scan time, and human reaction time [15]. For 3 NMI and 5 NMI 
separations, Thompson and Andrews evaluate RSP needed to support the 
separation minimum [16]. Eventually, the RSP has been defined. Sakae 
Nagaoka estimated a radar separation minimum based on the long-range 
secondary surveillance radar. In his work, position errors mainly depend on the 
azimuth of the aircraft, and the separation minimum is evaluated [17]. Gazit 
discussed the probability that the separation minimum can be reduced when 
GPS is used as the main navigation sensors [18]. The result is that the GPS 
sensor can provide a smaller separation minimum than the radar sensors does. 
Jones provided an idea that ADS-B can be used to support the 3 NMI and 5 
NMI separation minimum [19]. Michael evaluated separation though the ADS-B 
in LOUISVILLE, in 2009 [20]. The result shows that the ADS-B can satisfy the 
requirements used to set a 5 NMI separation minimum. 
As the existing separation minimum risk assessment model is based on ground 
aids technology, or the model considers navigation performance only, it is 
suggested to develop an assessment model not only considering navigation 
performance, but also considering communication performance and 
surveillance performance.  
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Another motivation is that trajectory prediction methods are widely used in air 
traffic controller areas at current time. By using trajectory tracking methods, 
more accurate aircraft position estimation can be achieved. As a result, the 
separation minimum can be reduced. The research follows the procedure 
shown in Figure 1-4. 
Get Aircraft 
Position from 
ADS-B
CP < Target Level of Safety
Kalman Filter
Reich Model
Separation 
Safe
Separation 
Unsafe
Y
ES
NO
Position Prediction
( , , , ,...)CP f S Np T Collision Probability
 
Figure 1-4 Procedure of Research  
1.2 Objectives 
The Objectives of this thesis are shown as follows: 
 Study of advanced CNS/ATM technologies. 
 Study of performance-based CNS/ATM, including Requited Navigation 
Performance (RNP), Required Communication Performance (RCP) and 
Required Surveillance Performance (RSP). 
 Analyse constraints of CNS/ATM. 
 Develop an algorithm to improve aircraft tracking performance in global 
6 
ATM environment. 
 Calculate aircraft’s lateral, longitudinal and vertical separation minimum 
of parallel air routes. 
1.3 Outline of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 reviews development of CNS systems, including conventional CNS 
systems, FANS CNS systems and performance based CNS systems. The 
advantages and shortcomings of these systems are discussed. At the end of 
this chapter, the separation minimum, including air route separation minimum 
and radar separation minimum, are studied.  
Chapter 3 gives a brief introduction to the safety assessment model of the 
separation minimum. The main task of this chapter is to introduce the 
separation minimum safety assessment model and analyse which parameter in 
the model has large effect on safety assessment issues.  
Chapter 4 introduces the method that is used in modelling the aircraft’s position 
uncertainty. Firstly, this chapter analyses the uncertainty sources. Then 
coordinate transformations, aircraft dynamic model and Kalman filter used in 
this thesis, are introduced. Finally, simulation and results shows that the 
position uncertainty is reduced by using the Kalman filter. 
Chapter 5 calculates lateral, longitudinal and vertical separation minimum by 
using the Reich model. The main purpose of this chapter is to use a case study 
to demonstrate effectiveness of the method proposed in this thesis. 
Chapter 6 concludes the work of this thesis. Also future work is recommended. 
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2 Study of CNS/ATM 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the development of CNS systems. A special 
committee was built by ICAO for the FANS in 1983. Originally, this committee 
focused on the next navigation system, but in 1991, ICAO expanded its 
mission to CNS/ATM in the global environment. At the same time, ICAO 
recognised that there was not a normalized set of standards to describe the 
ability of airspace and aircraft. So firstly, ICAO proposed RNP to define 
operational requirements for a navigation system in different airspace. Then, 
RCP and RSP were proposed. Finally, a new concept of Required Total 
System Performance (RTSP) was developed. Based on the RTSP, it is easy 
to classify airspace into different levels, and determine the aircraft’s CNS 
systems performance. Section 2.2, Section 2.3, and Section 2.4 discuss 
development of the communication system, navigation system and 
surveillance system, respectively. Meanwhile, the advantages and 
disadvantages are discussed. Section 2.5 describes air traffic management 
systems. Aircraft separation minimum are presented in Section 2.5. Finally, a 
summary is given in Section 2.7. 
2.2 Communication System 
Future CNS/ATM systems will be hybrid systems. Conventional voice 
communication continues to be used via existing high frequency (HF) radios 
and very high frequency (VHF) radios. However, more and more 
communication will be based on digital data links such as digital HF radios 
and VHF radios. Another big change is that communication based on satellite 
technology will be introduced, especially in some remote air routes, for 
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example, oceanic areas where it is difficult to build HF and VHF ground 
stations used to support communication between aircraft and ATM controllers. 
Many advantages can be gained from the future communication system. 
Pilots and air traffic controllers can send digital data information to each other 
in a more efficient way, using data displays instead of voice. Also, based on 
digital data link, many control functions can be implemented in an automatic 
way which can reduce controllers’ workload. 
Another motivation of the development of the communication system is that 
automatic surveillance technologies rely on digital data communication. In 
order to achieve the surveillance functions, some special digital 
communications are introduced, such as VHF Data Link (VDL Mode 4), 
Universal Access Transceiver (978 MHz UAT) and Mode-S Extended Squitter 
(1090 MHz, 1090 ES). 1090 ES data link, proposed by ICAO, is based on 
Mode-S and Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) technologies. UAT is a 
standard data link, proposed by FAA [21]-[24]. The future communication 
system is shown in Figure 2-1. 
 
Figure 2-1 Communication System [21] 
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2.2.1 Conventional Communication System 
Communication systems are used to connect between pilots and air traffic 
controllers, because the controllers need to know states of aircraft during all 
phases of flight. For example, when the controllers detect a potential collision 
happening between aircraft, they will use the communication systems to notify 
the pilots to perform a resolution manoeuvre. At the current time, connections 
between pilots and controllers are usually via HF and VHF voice 
communication. Current voice communication architecture is shown in Figure 
2.2. 
 
Figure 2-2 Voice Communication Architecture 
VHF voice communication: VHF communication can be used for air to 
ground and air to air communication. However, the communication range of 
the VHF radio is affected by the Earth’s curvature. Usually, the working range 
is line of sight (LOS). Because of the high reliability and high availability of the 
VHF, the VHF voice communication will be kept in use in the future CNS/ATM, 
especially in terminal areas. 
The frequency band of VHF is limited - which is from 118MHZ to 137MHZ. As 
the number of aircraft increase, ICAO expanded the VHF frequency band and 
reduced channel spacing several times, as shown in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2-1 VHF Frequency and Channel Spacing [22] 
 
HF voice communication: HF communication can provide communication 
service between pilots and controllers beyond the line of sight. Pilots use HF 
communication when VHF can not provide service in some remote and 
oceanic areas where it is hard to build VHF ground stations.  
HF signal transmits long range, depending on the ionised layers reflecting 
(Figure 2-3). However, the ionised layers are unstable - at different times, the 
ionised layers have different optimum reflecting frequency. Therefore, HF 
communication needs to use adaptive frequency to get high quality 
communication. The quality of communication also depends on the different 
seasons in a year; for example, in summer it is better than in winter [23]. 
Frequency band of HF is from 2 MHZ to 30 MHZ. 
 
Figure 2-3 HF Communication Model [24] 
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2.2.2 FANS communication System 
FANS communication system is a communication network system, named as 
aeronautical telecommunications network (ATN). In the ATN, every user, such 
as aircraft pilot, air traffic controller and airline operator, is considered as an 
end-system. These end systems share information through the ATN. For 
ground application, the biggest benefit expected from ATN is that the system 
can share all distributed computer resources. It means that ATM will be more 
powerful and efficient. For aircraft application, the ability to transfer data can 
serve to achieve the automatic functions in flight management systems, which 
can reduce the workload of pilots, and improve the ability of the flight 
management system. Four types of transceivers, which are HF digital radio, 
VHF digital radio, satellite digital transceivers and 1090 ES, are used to 
communicate between airplane and ground station. Each radio can be used to 
achieve functions which are Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS), 
Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC), Flight Information 
services and Context Management. Figure 2.4 shows the ATN architecture. 
 
Figure 2-4 ATN Architecture 
“Aeronautical Telecommunication Network (ATN): An inter-network 
architecture that allows ground, air to ground, and avionic data sub-networks 
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to inter operate by adopting common interface services and protocols based 
on the international organization for standardization (ISO) open systems 
interconnection (OSI) reference model” [21]. 
VHF digital link (VDL): VDL is a main system used to achieve advanced ATM. 
Voice radio will serve as a back up for digital radio, especially in some high 
density airspaces which need high quality and quick response communication. 
Until now, ICAO has recommended four types of VHF digital radios [24]. 
 VDL-1: VDL-1 is widely used at the current time. This radio is used to 
achieve the functions of Aircraft Communications Addressing and 
Reporting System (ACARS). Technology is AM-ASK, and channel 
space is 25 kHz. 
 VDL-2: Technology is D8PSK, which is totally different from VDL-1. Of 
course, VDL-2 can provide faster data rates than VDL-1 does. 
Average data rate is about 31.5 kbps, and channel space is 25 kHz. 
 VDL-3: New technologies, such as time division multiple accesses 
(TDMA) and Differential 8-ary Phase Shift Keying (D8PSK), are used 
in this radio. Data rate is round 31.5 kbps, and channel space is 25 
kHz. 
 VDL-4: It is a more advanced digital radio. Self-organizing time division 
multiple access (STDMA), which is a more advanced and 
complicated technology, has been used in this radio. Data rate is 
about 19.2 Kbps, and channel space is 25 kHz. 
Satellite digital communication: The advantage of this system, compared with 
other methods of long-range communications, is its ability to permit global 
coverage. Satellite communications, combined with satellite navigation 
system, are making new concepts of air traffic control and operation possible; 
for example ADS, CPDLC and automatic air traffic control.  
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HF digital radio: HF digital radio is also called HF data link (HFDL). In some 
remote and oceanic areas where VHF data link can not provide coverage, this 
data link can provide service. Besides this, HFDL has some other benefits: 
firstly, cost is lower than satellite data link; secondly, some aircraft without 
satellite equipment can use HFDL; finally, HFDL can serve as a back up 
system for satellite data link.  
1090 ES: 1090 ES is a data link based on technology of MODE-S. Until now, 
this link has only been used to support ADS-B function. Broadcast frequency 
is 1090 MHz, and information transmitted in this data link is aircraft’s state 
data, such as position, velocity and heading angle. 
Controller and pilot data link communication: CPDLC and ADS are two 
typical applications of the digital data links which have been introduced above. 
Via CPDLC, a traffic control system can build a link to aircraft. Using this link, 
the automatic air traffic control system can send control data to the aircraft 
without the controller’s involvement. This means that by using this automatic 
control procedure, the workload of the controller and pilot can be reduced 
sharply. Meanwhile, performance of ATM will be improved. Figure 2.5 shows 
the architecture of CPDLC. 
 
Figure 2-5 CPDLC Procedure 
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2.2.3 Performance Based Communication System 
RCP is a set of standards to define operational requirements for 
communication systems. It is a concept of how to specify the requirements for 
communication systems that support ATM functions. 
ICAO uses four key parameters to specify RCP (Transaction time, Continuity, 
Availability, Integrity). [24] 
 Transaction time: The maximum time for communication system to 
finish an operational transaction. 
 Continuity: Probability of the communication system finishing an 
operational transaction within the transaction time. 
 Availability: Probability of the communication system being available 
when an operational transaction needs to be start. 
 Integrity: Probability of the communication system finishing an 
operational transaction within the transaction time with errors 
undetected.  
For different applications, RCP has different types. The detail is shown in 
Table 2.2. 
Table 2-2 RNP Types [24] 
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2.3 Navigation System 
Conventional ground station aided navigational methods will continue to be 
used in the future FANS navigation systems. However, as satellite 
navigational technologies develop, more and more navigation will depend on 
global satellite navigation system (GNSS). GNSS covers worldwide airspace, 
and in the future, GNSS can be used to navigate aircraft not only for en-route, 
but also for approaches. Eventually, GNSS could be a replacement for ground 
station aided navigation methods used at the current time. 
The advantages gained from the GNSS are that receivers installed on aircraft 
are very simple and can provide worldwide coverage. For example, in some 
remote continental area and oceanic airspace, ground aided navigation can 
not be built, so no navigation function can be provided. However, GNSS 
overcomes this limitation. 
Figure 2.6 shows a view that as CNS technologies develop, the separation 
minimum of air routes reduces. Figure 2-6 (a) is the conventional air route, 
which is based on ground navigation aids. Because of limited navigation 
accuracy, the separation minimum is the largest among the three air routes. 
Figure 2-6 (b) and Figure 2-6 (c) which are partly performance-based air 
routes have the smaller separation minimum. This means that in the same 
airspace, using RNP air route can accommodate more aircraft than using the 
conventional air route. 
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(a) Conventional Air Route           (b) RNAV Air Route    (c) RNP Air Route 
Figure 2-6 Conventional Air Route, RNAV Air Route, RNP Air Route [25] 
2.3.1 Conventional Navigation System 
Based on different applications, navigation systems can be divided into 
several types. VOR and DME often provide bearing and distance 
measurements relative to ground stations in the en-route phase. ILS and 
Marker Beacon are used in the descending and landing phases. INS is a self-
contained long-range navigation aid, independent of external signal inputs. 
VHF Omnidirectional Range (VOR): This navigation radio aid is the system 
widely used in en-route and terminal areas currently. VOR operates in 
frequency range 108 MHz to 117.95 MHz, and work range is Line-of-Sight. 
Ground station sends two signals: one is a reference signal whose phase 
does not vary; another one is a variable phase signal whose phase varies 
accordance to signal direction. The receivers, installed on aircraft, compare 
the two signals to get the aircraft’s bearing, relative to the VOR ground station 
(Figure 2-7). 
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Figure 2-7 VOR Navigation 
Distance Measuring System (DME): DME is used to measure distance in 
nautical miles to a DME ground station. Distance measuring equipment is 
normally located with or close to VOR navigation transmitters on the ground. 
The DME system operates in frequency range 960 MHz to 1215 MHz. A DME 
transmitter is fitted on aircraft and is called an interrogator. The airborne 
interrogator is used to interrogate a system in the DME ground station called a 
transponder. A system of distance and time measurement by the interrogator 
results in slant range measurement to the DME ground station. Figure 2.8 
shows the work procedure of DME. 
 
Figure 2-8 DME Navigation 
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Marker Beacon: This system work with instrument landing system (ILS) as a 
landing aid. A series of marker radio beacon transmitters have been located 
to help pilots, when a land approaching is being made. 
Ground marker radio beacon signals are transmitted at different locations 
along an instrument landing system approach. When an aircraft is en route to 
an airport runway, the ground maker beacon will provide the pilot with the 
exact point where that specific beacon is located. 
Often, according to the location, marker beacon can be divided into three 
types, outer beacon, middle beacon and inner beacon. They have the same 
work frequency - 75 MHz. 
The work procedure is shown in Figure 2.9. 
 
Figure 2-9 Marker Beacon 
Instrument Landing System (ILS): The ILS signal is transmitted in frequency 
range of 108.1 MHz to 111.9 MHz. Ground transmitter which is located close 
to the runway radiates signal towards incoming aircraft. Two directional slopes 
are sent out. One to the left directional slope is modulated with a 90 Hz audio 
signal. The right slope is modulated with a 150 Hz audio signal. The centreline 
of the runway is where both signals are equal. When an aircraft is on 
approach and is left of the runway the 90 Hz predominates, right of the 
runway the 150 Hz beam is stronger (Figure 2-10). On board the aircraft a 
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radio navigation radio receiver is able to process the signal to guide the 
aircraft along the centreline of the localiser and glide slope radio beam. 
 
Figure 2-10 ILS Approaching 
Inertial Navigation System (INS): INS is a self-contained system, which can 
be used for long-range navigation. Navigation performance can be improved 
by other systems, such as GPS and air data system. 
2.3.2 FANS Navigation System 
FANS navigation system mainly depends on satellite navigation technology. 
Currently, Satellite Navigation System often contains three parts – a space 
part, control part, and a user part (Figure 2.11). The space part is comprised 
of the satellite constellation, made up of multiple satellites. The satellites 
provide the basic navigation frame of reference, and transmit the radio signals 
from which the users can collect measurements required for this navigation 
solution. Knowledge of the satellites’ position and time history is also required 
for the user’s solution, and the satellites also transmit that information via data 
modulation of the signals. 
The control part includes three major segments: 
 Monitor stations which track the signal transmitted by satellites and 
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pick up measurements. 
 A master control station that uses these measurements to determine 
and predict the satellite health. 
 Ground antennas that perform the upload and general control of the 
satellite. 
The user segment is comprised of the receiving equipment and processors 
that perform the navigation solution. 
The basic satellite theory is illustrated in Figure 2.12. Because of the errors, 
the measurements are not range, but pseudo range. If only range is 
measured, the equations are as follows: 
i i si u iPR R c t c t pr       
iPR  is the pseudorange to the satellite i . 
iR  is the real range to the satellite. 
sit  is the clock error in the satellite. 
 ut  is the receiver clock error. 
c is the velocity of light. 
ipri  are the others errors, such as atmospheric delays, the Earth’s rotation 
correction, multi path noise and receiver noise. 
If the errors are neglected, the range is given as: 
2 2 2( ) ( ) ( )i si u si u si uR X X Y Y Z Z       
siX , siY , siZ  are the position of the satellite. 
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 uX , uY , uZ  are the position of the user. 
 
Figure 2-11  Satellite Navigation System Architecture [25] 
 
Figure 2-12 Ranging Solution [25] 
There are three major satellite navigation systems, GPS, GLONASS and 
GALILEO. 
2.3.3 Performance Based Navigation System 
There are several reasons which result in the emergence of RNP concepts. 
Firstly, the aviation industries continue to increase rapidly, and as a result, air 
space gets more congested. Secondly, the method which is used to track 
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aircraft has been enhanced. Lastly, new navigation systems, such as satellite 
navigation, have improved navigation performance. Based on these reasons, 
ICAO developed new performance based navigation concepts, such as RNAV 
and RNP. The biggest difference between RNP and RNAV is that the RNP 
has receiver autonomous integrity monitoring function, but the RNAV does not. 
Area Navigation (RNAV): RNAV is a navigation method. It enables aircraft to 
fly a preferred air route in range of navigation signals. In other words, the 
RNAV integrates multi navigation sensors to give out estimation of the aircraft, 
then build the preferred flight route, and navigate the aircraft to fly along the 
route. Unlike conventional navigation methods that the aircraft must fly 
navigation aids one by one, which results in a small part of airspace being 
used, RNAV can make full use of the airspace and improve the efficiency of 
aircraft ability. The sensors used by RNAV are INS/IRS, VOR/DME/, 
DME/DME, LORAN C, GNSS. A complex RNAV architecture of aircraft is 
shown in Figure 2.13. RNP types and applications are shown in Table 2-3. 
  
Figure 2-13 RNAV and RNP Navigation Architecture [26] 
Table 2-3 RNAV Types and Applications [26] 
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Required Navigation Performance RNP: RNP is a concept to describe the 
accuracy of a navigation system in a particular airspace. Aircraft that want to 
fly in a particular airspace must have specific RNP type. The RNP type is 
defined as a 95% containment value and a measure of navigation 
performance accuracy (Figure 2-14). RNP types used present, are shown in 
Table 2-4.  
ICAO uses 4 key parameters, which are accuracy, integrity, continuity and 
availability, to describe the navigation system performance.  
 Accuracy: the ability of the system to maintain the position within a 
specified error with 95% probability. 
 Integrity: the quality which related to the thrust that can be placed in the 
correctness of the information. Integrity risk is the probability of an 
undetected failure of the specified accuracy. 
 Continuity: the ability of the system to perform its function without 
unscheduled interruptions. 
 Availability: the ability of the system to provide the required guidance at 
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the initiation of the intend operation. 
Table 2-4 RNP Types and Applications 
[26]  
 
Figure 2-14 RNP Containment [26] 
2.4 Surveillance System 
The future Surveillance system is a hybrid system. ADS technology will be 
widely used in the future. However, in some busy areas, such as terminal 
areas and congestion en-route areas, PSR and SSR are going to be used to 
monitor aircraft. The hybrid surveillance system is shown in Figure 2-15.  
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The main function of ADS is to broadcast the host state vectors to other users, 
such as vicinity aircraft and ground traffic control stations. When ground traffic 
control stations receive these state vectors, they can use these data to predict 
the aircraft’s position in the future, and they also can use the data to improve 
the surveillance ability of SSR and PSR via data fusion. 
ADS can also be seen as a communications application that represents the 
true merging of communications and navigation technologies. ADS state 
vectors come from GNSS, and ADS use digital data communication methods 
(satellite, 1090 ES, UAT, VDL-4) to send these data. Current ADS version in 
usage is ADS-B. Benefits would come from ADS in oceanic and some 
continental areas that currently have no radar coverage. 
 
Figure 2-15 Future Surveillance Architecture 
2.4.1 Conventional Surveillance System 
Traditional SSR and PSR are widely used to monitor aircraft. 
PSR: this ground based radar is a system which sends out radio frequency 
waves in a narrow directed beam. This beam strikes the aircraft. Part of the 
beam signal is reflected off the outer skin of the aircraft. This reflected signal 
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is picked up by a ground radar antenna and coupled to a ground radar 
receiver. After the signal being processed, the range and azimuth information 
between aircraft and radar can be deduced, and then the information is 
displayed on the air traffic controller’s radar display screen. This display is 
known as planned position indicator (PPI). PSR is important but the 
information given to a ground controller is not enough; for example, the 
controller has no way of knowing what aircraft he is watching and how high it 
is flying. 
 
Figure 2-16 PSR and SSR 
Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR): The secondary radar is different from 
the primary in that it uses a transponder installed on the aircraft to produce 
the information needed. The ground receiver called the “interrogator” 
transmits coded radio frequency pulses to an aircraft. The interrogator signals 
trigger an aircraft’s transponder to reply. This reply from the aircraft is picked 
up at the ground radar receiver. The reply is decoded by equipment at the 
ground station and coupled to a display monitor screen. An air traffic controller 
will now have displayed on his screen the identity and altitude of the aircraft. 
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When the PSR and SSR information are combined, they give the controller all 
the information necessary: altitude, bearing, range and location. 
2.4.2 FANS Surveillance System 
The conventional surveillance system mainly relies on PSR and SSR, but this 
architecture has some significant shortcomings. For example, many PSR or 
SSR should be built to support the surveillance function; however, oceanic 
areas and remote areas are not suitable for building PSR or SSR ground 
stations. 
Automatic dependent surveillance (ADS) has been defined by ICAO as a 
function used by ATS in the future. Through data link, aircraft automatically 
send states data, such as three-dimensional position, which come from on-
board navigation system to vicinity users. Using satellite communications, 
ADS will allow aircraft to be monitored and controlled when they are outside 
the work range of air traffic radar. It is planned that anywhere in the world, 
when flying in airspace over large areas of desert and sea, air traffic control 
can obtain an aircraft’s current position, intended flight path and other 
information held in the onboard navigation systems. These functions can be 
achieved automatically, without the need for direct pilot’s and controller’s 
involvement (Figure 2-17). The states information contains: 
 Position information 
 Route information 
 Meteorological information 
Communication interface: ADS use different communication systems: HF, 
VHF, Satellite, Mode S. 
ATM automation and ADS: Via ADS, ATM can get many benefits, shown as 
follows: 
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 Flight data validation, 
 Conformance monitoring, 
 Automated tracking, 
 Conflict detection, 
 Conflict resolution. 
 
Figure 2-17 ADS Applications [27] 
Auto dependant surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B): ADS-B is to broadcast state 
information to the nearby aircraft via communication medium. As shown in 
Figure 2.18, the ADS-B application gets data from different sources, and 
sends these data to other aircraft or ground stations; therefore, the aircraft 
can be monitored.  
The data transmitted via ADS-B are identification, state vector, status, intent 
information, and class code.  
Besides the 3D position data, the navigation uncertainty category position 
(NUCp) is sent. Therefore, when users receive the ADS-B information, they 
can determine whether position data can be trusted or not, and errors of 
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position can be calculated based on the NUCp (Table 2.5). Similar to the 
NUCp parameter which is used to describe the velocity, Navigation 
Uncertainty Categories Velocity (NUCv) is broadcasted too (Table2.6). 
ICAO uses some key parameters to define performance of ADS-B system, 
such as update time, latency, availability, continuity and integrity.  
Table 2-5 NUCp [27] 
 
 
Figure 2-18 ADS-B System  
Table 2-6 NUCv [27] 
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2.4.3 Performance Based Surveillance System 
RSP: It is a set of performance requirements for surveillance systems. A 
surveillance system is used to ensure that aircraft are separated correctly. 
Aircraft’s position information needs to be updated every 4 seconds in high-
traffic airspace. However, in low-traffic airspace such as oceanic and remote 
airspace, the updating time is slightly longer, so position information needs to 
be updated every 12 seconds. Another usage of a surveillance system is that 
the system should have the ability to support free flight in the future [27]. 
ICAO uses 5 key parameters, which are accuracy, update time, integrity, 
continuity and availability, to describe the surveillance system performance. 
Some papers discuss RSP based on some particular application ([16], [27]-
[28]). Accuracy and update time of ADS-B are taken into account in this thesis. 
 Accuracy: the ability of the surveillance system to measure the 
aircraft’s position. 
 Update time: the maximum time used to update the measurement to 
controller. 
 Integrity: Integrity risk is the probability of an undetected failure of the 
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specified accuracy. 
 Continuity: the ability of the system to perform its function within the 
update time without errors undetected. 
 Availability: the ability of the system to provide the required surveillance 
function at the initiation of the intend operation. 
2.5 Air Traffic Management Systems 
Functions of ATM are airspace management (ASM), air traffic flow 
management (ATFM), air traffic information service (ATS), air traffic control 
(ATC) and flight operations. Based on new CNS technologies described 
above, the ability of ATM can receive a direct enhancement. More 
appropriately, advancements in CNS technologies will serve to support ATM. 
 
Figure 2-19 CNS/ATM Advantages: a high level view [29] 
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Combined benefits gained from the advanced CNS technologies, together 
with increasing use of the automation, will lead to an improved ATM system. 
Figure 2.19 shows the advantages. 
2.6 Separation Minimum 
2.6.1 Airspace Concept and ATC Constraints 
How many aircraft can be accommodated in airspace? This depends on 
several factors. The first one is the separation between aircraft (Figure 2.20). 
When the separation decreases, it means more aircraft can fly in airspace. 
The second factor is conflict detection and resolution ability of ATC.  
The main work of ATC is to ensure separation between adjacent aircraft. The 
efficiency of ATC depends on the availability of communications and 
surveillance capabilities. The risk of collision depends on navigation 
performance, communication performance and surveillance performance, so 
a model should be used to describe ATC constraints and abilities. This thesis 
focuses on the effect of ATC constraints on the separation minimum safety 
assessment issues. Other factors, such as human factors, air route 
configuration and traffic density, which can affect the separation minimum 
assessment, are not taken into account. 
 
Figure 2-20 Aircraft Separation: Lateral, Longitudinal and Vertical [27] 
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Figure 2-21 CNS/ATM Characteristics [28] 
Separation minimum standard was induced from performance of navigation in 
the past time. However, communication and surveillance ability are important 
too. Therefore, some researchers provided a new concept of RTSP which 
integrates RSP, RCP and RNP to describe the ability of CNS/ATM [28].  
RTSP: It is a normalized, standard, rational, consistent set of performance 
metrics, which are used to describe a particular airspace region. Meanwhile, if 
aircraft want to fly in this region, they must have according system 
performance. The normalized set of performance requirements regulates the 
behaviour of air aircraft operators and air traffic control functions providers. 
Figure 2-22 shows RTSP of CNS systems and its applications. 
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Figure 2-22 Required Total System Performance [28] 
2.6.2 Parallel Air Route Separation Minimum 
According to reference [30], there are two types of air route architecture - 
parallel route and cross route. In order to simplify the issue, only parallel air 
route separation minimum will be discussed here. 
As shown in Figure 2.23, two air routes are parallel to each other. Aircraft are 
expected to fly along the dotted line, and stay within the air route space. How 
to set the separation minimum S or the air route space to meet the target level 
of safety (TLS) of 95 10 [30], based on constraints of current CNS systems, is 
the main task of this thesis. 
 
Figure 2-23 Lateral Separation [30] 
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Air route space or separation is affected by several factors, such as 
navigation performance, exposure to risk and intervention ability of ATC 
(Figure 2.24). When a new air route is built, the first work is to estimate the 
collision risk [24].  
 
Figure 2-24 Air Route Separation and Space Model [24] 
According to different system ability and traffic density, air route space is 
different. For example, based on navigation type RNP4, usually 50/50 NMI 
separation minimum can satisfy the requirement of TLS, but for the RNP 2, 
10/10 NMI separation minimum is enough [30].  
For the vertical separation, the separation minimum is 2000ft above FL290, 
and under FL290, the separation minimum is 1000ft [43]. 
2.6.3 Radar Separation Minimum 
As described in Section 2.3.1, there are two types of surveillance radar 
systems - PSR and SSP. Usually, these two radars work together to provide 
service. Radar separation is mainly affected by 4 factors: estimation accuracy 
of aircraft position, radar scan time, controller and system reaction time, and 
time needed to resolve the collision. 
The radar separation minimum is different in different areas; for example, in 
the terminal area, the radar separation minimum is 3 NMI within a range of 40 
NMI from surveillance radar, but 3 NMI separation minimum can safely be 
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expanded to a range of 60 NMI from surveillance radar implemented by using 
advanced technology. In the en route area, the radar separation minimum is 5 
NMI within the range of 200 NMI from surveillance radar - this range can also 
be extended to 250 NMI [14]. 
Based on radar surveillance, the vertical separation minimum is 1000ft in en 
the route area, and this value can be reduced to 500ft in the terminal area. 
2.7 Summary 
In this chapter, development of CNS systems has been presented, and the 
advantages and disadvantages have been discussed. The main tasks of this 
chapter are summarized as follows: 
1. Study of the development of CNS systems, including conventional CNS 
systems, FANS CNS systems and performance based CNS systems. 
2. Comparison of different types of CNS systems, and the advantages and 
disadvantages have been presented. 
3. Introduction of air space concept, moreover, how to use the performance 
based CNS systems (RTSP) to describe the ability of the airspace has 
been discussed. 
4. Review of air route separation minimum and radar surveillance separation 
minimum.  
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3 Separation Minimum Safety Assessment Model 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the Reich model used to evaluate the separation 
minimum safety issues. Firstly, air route architecture, proximity shell, separation 
vector and slab are introduced in section 3.2.1 and Section 3.2.2; then, the 
Reich model is described in Section 3.2.3; finally, a summary is given in Section 
3.2. 
3.2 Reich Model [4]-[6] 
3.2.1 Air Route 
Air route architecture: Air route architectures include parallel air route and cross 
air route. In this thesis, parallel air route is discussed. Parallel air route includes 
traditional and composite architecture shown in Figure 3.1. xS , yS and zS  
represent the longitudinal separation, lateral separation and vertical separation, 
respectively. 
 
(a) Traditional                    (b) composite 
Figure 3-1 Parallel Air Route 
3.2.2 Proximity Shell and Slab 
Proximity shell: Separation standards, which are denoted by xS , yS  and zS , are 
shown in Figure 3.2. A box has been built around aircraft A. when aircraft B is 
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close to or inside the box, the collision risk will increase rapidly. When the 
aircraft B is outside of the proximity shell, safety between two aircraft is 
guaranteed. 
 
Figure 3-2 Proximity Shell 
Separation vector: point A and point B (shown in Figure 3-3) represent intended 
position of aircraft A and Aircraft B, but because of errors, such as track errors, 
navigation errors and flight errors, the true positions are point A’ and point B’. 
Vector [AB] is intended separation. Vector [A’B’] is true separation. As the A’B’ 
shrinks to the separation standard, the probability of collision risk will arise. This 
collision risk depends on the vector [AB] and the position estimation errors. The 
separation vector is shown in Figure 3-3. 
 
Figure 3-3 Separation Vector 
Slab: Assumption that aircraft in air route has the same dimensions. x , y  and 
z  are used to describe length, span and thickness of the aircraft. A rectangular 
box with 2 x , 2 y and 2 z has been built. Aircraft A is in centre of the rectangular. 
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When aircraft B is on the face of or inside the rectangular box (Figure 3-4), a 
collision happened. So, the collision rate (CR) equals to the times that the 
aircraft B will fly into the slab. 
 
Figure 3-4 Collision Slab 
3.2.3 Safety Assessment 
Reich model: Before the Reich model is discussed, some assumptions will be 
defined. 
1. Air routes are parallel to each other, and separated by 
distance yS . 
2. Only adjacent collision is take in account in the parallel air route. 
3. Lateral deviations of the aircraft that fly in the adjacent routes 
are uncorrelated 
4. Velocity has no relationship to position. 
5. ATC controllers or pilots are not intended to solve collision when 
the collision happens, but the ability of ATC, required solving 
the collision, are considered in the model. 
6. A rectangular box is used to represent the aircraft in the model. 
7. The aircraft fly with a constant velocity during the cruise phase 
of flight. 
Procedure, used to calculate the collision risk, can be divided into two steps: 
firstly, time T, which is an integral of time that the aircraft B flies in the proximity 
shell of aircraft A, should be calculated; secondly, the collision rate (CR) per 
time units is calculated.  
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Calculating the CR: Following parameters can be defined: 
xN  is the frequency that longitudinal separation is less than x  
/ ' 'x xN longitudinal collision times duration which A B is less than S
 
 (3-1)
yN , zN  are the frequency, which lateral separation and vertical separation are 
less than y , z , respectively. 
xP  is the probability which longitudinal separation is less than x  
' ' / ' 'x x xP duration which A B is less duration which A B is less than S
 
 (3-2)
yP , zP  are the probability that lateral separation and vertical separation are less 
than y , z , respectively. 
xT   is the time, which is needed for aircraft to pass though the slab, so xT  is 
given by 
2 /x x xT V  
xV  is longitudinal relative velocity of aircraft A and aircraft B. 
From equation 3-1 and equation 3-2, the following equation can be deduced. 
1
' '
x
x x x
N longitudinal collision times
P duration which A B is less T  (3-3)
The frequency, that aircraft A and aircraft B collide from front and end faces 
(Figure 3.4), is defined by the lateral and vertical collision frequency multiplied 
by the xN , which is denoted by x y zN P P . So, collision from top and bottom faces 
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is z x yN P P , and collision from either sides is y x zN P P . Therefore, the total 
collision CR is given by 
x y z y x z z x yCR N P P N P P N P P    
In this thesis, parallel air route is taken into consideration. yP , zP , yN , zN  are 
( )y yP S , (0)zP , ( )y yN S , (0)zN . So, the lateral risk model is shown as follows: 
[ ( ) (0)] [ ( ) (0) (0) ( )]y x y y z x y y z z y yCR N P S P P N S P N P S   (3-4)
According to equation 3-2, xP  can be rewritten as follows 
2 /
2 /
x x
x
x x
VP
S V
  
According to equation 3-3, xN  is given by 
/
2 / 2
x x x x
x
x x x x
P S VN
T V S

    
so the yCR  can be rewritten as follows: 
1 [ ( ) (0) ( ) (0) (0) ( )]
2
x
y y y z x y y z x z y y
x
VCR P S P N S P N P S
S
     
If aircraft, in the same and opposite direction (Figure 3-5), are take into account 
together, yCR  is as follow: 
( ) ( )
[ ( ) (0) ( ) (0) (0) ( )] [ ( ) (0) ( ) (0) (0) ( )]
2 2
y yx x
y y y z x y y z x z y y y y z x y y z x z y y
x x
T sam T oppV VCR P S P N S P N P S P S P N S P N P S
S S
        
 
 (3-5)
xV  is the same direction relative velocity. 
xV  is the opposite relative velocity. 
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Calculating ( )yT sam  and ( )yT opp : 
( ) 3.5( )yT sam aggregate of times spentby all pairs in the configurarion of Figure a  
( ) 3.5( )yT sam aggregate of times spentby all pairs in the configurarion of Figure b  
 
 
      (a) Same Direction                      (b) Opposite Direction 
Figure 3-5 Laterally Proximate Pairs 
The parallel air route architecture is shown in Figure 3.6. Let aircraft’s flow rate 
in path (i,j) be 
ijM  
For a aircraft in the path (i, j), the maximum number of aircraft within a 
longitudinal separation ± xS  of it on path (i-1, j) is 
1,
2 x
i j
S M
V 
 
Therefore, for a long range air route, aircraft proximity rate between path (i, j) 
and path (i-1, j) is given by 
1, ,2
2 x
i j i j
LS M M
V 
 
Then, ( )yT sam  and ( )yT opp  can be deduced as follows: 
43 
1, ,2
2 1
1, ,2
2 1
2( )
2( )
ft
x
y i j i j
i j
ft
x
y i j i j
i j
LST sam M M
V
LST opp M M
V

 

 
 



 
(3-6)
 
Figure 3-6 Parallel Air Route 
To sum up, the lateral collision risk can be derived as follows: 
2
( ) (0) [ ( ){ } ( ){ }]
2 2 2 2 2 2
x
y y y z y y
x x y z x y z
V y z V y z
N P S P E same E opp
S

     
       
  
 (3-7)
The parameters in equation 3-7 are shown in table 3-1. 
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Table 3-1 Lateral Collision Model Parameters Definition 
 
The vertical collision risk model can be derived as follows 
2
( ) (0) [ ( ){ } ( ){ }]
2 2 2 2 2 2
x
z z z y z z
x x y z x y z
V y z V y z
N P S P E same E opp
S

     
       
 
 (3-8)
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Table 3-2 Vertical Collision Model Parameters Definition  
 
The longitudinal collision risk model is given by 
2
( ) (0) (0) [ ( ){ } ( ){ }]
2 2 2 2 2 2
x
x x x z y x x
x x y z x y z
V y z V y z
N P S P P E same E opp
S

     
         
 (3-9)
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Table 3-3 Longitudinal Collision Model Parameters Definition 
 
In the Reich model, the main factors contributing to the separation minimum are 
traffic density and probability of overlap. So, how to calculate the probability of 
overlap will be discussed. 
When two aircraft are intended to be separated by 0S (Figure 3-7), the probability 
of overlap is defined by: 
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12
0( ) ( )
xP S f x dx


   
12 ( )f x  denotes the probability density of the separation 12x between two aircraft. 
Deviations of two aircraft from their intended position are denoted by 1x  and 2x  
respectively. 12x is given by 
12 0 1 2x S x x    
and 
12
1 0 1 1( ) ( ) ( )
x x xf x f x f S x x dx


    
Where aircraft’s position distributions are independent, 0( )P S  can be rewritten 
as follow 
0 1 0 1 1( ) ( ) ( )
x xP S f x f S x x dx dx



 
     (3-10)
 
Figure 3-7 Parallel Air Route 
3.3 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the Reich model used to evaluate separation 
minimum safety issues. The main missions of this chapter are summarised as 
follows: 
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1. Review of cases which use Reich model to evaluate the separation safety 
issues. 
2. Introduction of safety assessment model of the separation minimum. 
3. Analysis of the parameters in the Reich model which have a large effect on 
safety assessment issues. 
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4 Modelling Aircraft’s Position Uncertainty 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the Kalman filter, used to improve aircraft’s trajectory 
tracking performance, and as a result, position uncertainty can be reduced. The 
Kalman filter, which has been widely used in integrated navigation systems, is a 
powerful tool used to track manoeuvring aircraft. Section 4.2 describes air route 
architectures discussed in this thesis. Section 4.3 discusses the ATC services 
and constraints of the air routes. Section 4.4 gives aircraft’s uncertainty sources. 
Section 4.5 uses the Kalman filter to model the aircraft’s horizontal position 
uncertainty. Section 4.6 models the vertical position uncertainty. Finally, a 
summary is given in Section 4.7. 
4.2 Air route Architectures 
According to reference [28], phases of flight can be divided into five parts, which 
are takeoffs, departures, en route, arrivals and approaches. In different flight 
phases, aircraft have different navigation performance (shown in Figure 4-1). 
Parallel air routes are built for risk assessment. As shown in Figure 4-2, two 
parallel air routes separated by ST have been constructed. Aircraft in 
arrival/departure phases have RNP1 navigation performance, and in en route 
phase have RNP5 navigation performance. The aircraft’s cruising altitude is 
FL390. 
Aircraft flying in the adjacent air routes obey the following assumptions: 
 Assumption that positions of the aircraft that are flying in the adjacent air 
routes are independent. 
 Assumption that the aircraft’s positions in three dimensions are independent. 
 Assumption that the aircraft’s velocity and position are independent. 
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 Assumption that the time of different aircraft entering into the air routes are 
independent. 
 
Figure 4-1 Navigation Type 
 
Figure 4-2 Air route Architecture 
4.3 ATC Services and Constraints 
Airspace in RNP 5 area is navigated by VOR/DME or the navigation tools which 
have the same performance. Surveillance system, in this area, is based on 
ADS-B system - aircraft can broadcast their position, position uncertainty, 
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velocity and velocity uncertainty to controllers. ATC controllers keep receiving 
and processing the information. If the controllers find a collision in the future, 
they will use digital communication system (in this thesis, communication 
system is assumed to be CPDLC system) to contact pilots and give resolution 
advice. The surveillance procedure is shown in Figure 4-3. 
 
Figure 4-3 Surveillance Architecture 
In this thesis, three parameters, which are navigation performance, ADS-B 
updating time and communication transaction time, are taken into account. In 
another way, these parameters are a definition of constraints of the CNS 
systems, because they define the performance of CNS systems used in this 
thesis. The value of the three parameters is given in Table 4-1. 
Table 4-1 CNS Systems Parameters 
Parameter Value 
Navigation 
performance 
RNP 5 
RNP 1 
ADS-B updating time 5 S 
Communication 
transaction time 
6 S 
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4.4 Uncertainty sources 
ICAO provides a definition of uncertainty of aircraft’s position, which is the 
difference between the actual aircraft location and the location where the air 
traffic controller believes the aircraft to be [29]. 
The total system error (TSE) includes flight technical error (FTE), display 
system error (DSE), path definition error (PDE), path steering error (PSE), and 
position estimation error (PEE). [30] 
Flight technical error: “The accuracy with which the aircraft is controlled as 
measured by the indicated aircraft position with respect to the indicated 
command or desired position.”  
Display system error: “These errors may include error components 
contributed by any input, output or signal conversion equipment used by the 
display as it presents either aircraft position or guidance commands (e.g. course 
deviation or command heading) and by any course definition entry device 
employed. For systems in which charts are incorporated as integral parts of the 
display, the display system error necessarily includes charting errors to the 
extent that they actually result in errors in controlling the position of the aircraft 
relative to a desired path over the ground.”  
Path definition error: “The difference between the defined path and the 
desired path at a specific point.” 
Path steering error: “The distance from the estimated position to the defined 
path. The PSE includes both FTE and display error (e.g., CDI error).” 
Position estimation error: “The difference between true position and 
estimated position.” 
TSE is a combination of flight technical error, display system error, RNAV/RNP 
computation error and navigation system error. TSE is given by [30] 
2 2 2 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )TSE FTE DSE PDE PSE PEE      (4-1)
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The TSE is demonstrated in Figure 4-4. 
Figure 4-4 Total System Error Demonstration [30] 
The distribution of total system error can be modelled by Gaussian or Double 
Exponential (DE) distributions [18], [25], [34]. Figure 4.5 shows the Gaussian 
and the Double Exponential (DE) distributions with the same mean value and 
variance. 
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Figure 4-5 Gaussian or Double Exponential (DE) Distributions 
The DE distribution, which has a long tail, is more conservative than the 
Gaussian distribution. In this thesis, the Gaussian distribution is used to model 
the TSE. 
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In order to monitor aircraft operation, the aircraft should have the ability to 
transmit its position information measured by on-board sensors, such as GPS 
or VOR/DME sensors, periodically to air traffic controllers. ADS-B aircraft has 
this ability, based on data link communication (e.g. VDL-4, INMARSAT, 
1090ES). Also, the ADS-B aircraft send their velocity information to ATC 
controllers via data link. After receiving this information, ATC controllers make a 
prediction of the collision probability of two aircraft. If there is a high collision 
probability in the future, the ATC controller will give a resolution advisory via 
data link (e.g. CPDLC) to the aircraft to perform an evasive manoeuvre.  
The position and velocity comprehension errors by the Air Traffic Controller, 
which is the difference between the actual aircraft position and the position 
where ATC consider the aircraft to be, depend on three factors - which are 
sensor errors, ADS-B updating time and Communication transaction time. As 
shown in Figure 4-3, the aircraft’s position displayed on the ATC console is not 
the same as the aircraft’s actual position, because the position which is 
measured by the sensors has more or less errors. The second parameter is 
ADS-B update time. Aircraft’s position uncertainty increases until ATC get the 
next information sent by the ADS-B aircraft. The last parameter that must be 
considered is communication transactions time needed for the ATC controller to 
send a resolution advisory to the aircraft. 
In the horizontal plane, let ( , )a cV V denote the along tracking velocity and cross 
tracking velocity, respectively. The actual position is denoted by ( , )ca ccP P . The 
current position which is reported by ADS-B aircraft is denoted by ,( )ca ccP P  for 
the along tracking and cross tracking respectively, and the predicted position at 
future time t  is denoted by ,( )ta tcP P . Similar to the position symbols, velocity in 
the future is denoted by ,( )ta tcP P . The ADS-B update time is denoted byT , and 
the communication transaction time is represented by  . The aircraft’s position 
is given by  
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ca ca
cc cc
P P R
P P R
 
   
(4-2)
Where R is a zero-mean normally distributed random variable whose variance 
can be calculated by using the ADS-B position uncertainty information. 
The aircraft’s velocity is given by 
ca a
cc c
V V W
V V W
 
   
(4-3)
W is a zero-mean normally distributed random variable whose variance can be 
calculated by using the ADS-B velocity uncertainty information. 
Therefore, the position in the future can be induced by 
*
*
ta ca ca
tc cc cc
P P V t
P P V t
 
   
(4-4)
The mean value of predicted position is denoted by 
( ) ( * ) *
( ) ( * ) *
ta ca ca ca ca
tc cc cc cc cc
E P E P V t P V t
E P E P V t P V t
   
     
(4-5)
In Section 3.2.1, an assumption that position and velocity are independent has 
been made, so the variance of predicted position is given by 
2 2 2
2 2 2
( ) ( * ) *
( ) ( * ) *
ta ca ca p v
tc cc cc p v
D P D P V t t
D P D P V t t
 
 
   
     
(4-6)
p  is the variance of R in equation (4-2), and v  is the variance of W in 
equation (4-3). However, ( )taD P  and ( )tcD P  will saturate to a constant value for 
a long term prediction [31]-[33]. pt  is used to denote the variance of predicted 
position at time t, so for a long term prediction, pt  is given by 
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2 2 2 2 2~ min( * , )pt p v t     (4-7)
The long time prediction error is shown in Figure 4-6, and the short term 
prediction error is shown in Figure 4-8. 
 
Figure 4-6 Long Time Prediction Error 
 
Figure 4-7 Short Time Prediction Error 
Navigation Accuracy Code for Position (NACP) included in the ADS-B 
information, indicates how accurate the reported position is. This value has the 
same meaning as the RNP value, which means that the aircraft is expected to 
remain within a specific volume of airspace for at least 95 percent of the flight 
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time. The NACP value, transmitted by ADS-B data link, is shown in the Table 
2.5. Navigation Uncertainty Categories – Velocity (NUCV) included in the ADS-B 
information is used to describe accuracy of the reported velocity. The NUCV, 
value, transmitted through ADS-B data link, is shown in Table 2.6. 
Calculating position probability density function: the parallel air routes built, 
in Section 4.2, have RNP 5 navigation performance in en-route areas. In 
equation 3-2, parameter R is a zero-mean normally distributed random variable 
whose probability density function is given by 
2
2
( )
21( )
2
r
f r e



  (4-8)
Where   equals zero. The variance   can be determined by the RNP value. 
For RNP 5, the variance  is given by 
5
5
( ) 0.95f r dr

  (4-9)
So,   is given by 
2.551nm   
Calculating the velocity probability density function: in equation 4-2, W is a 
zero-mean normally distributed random variable, and the probability density 
function is given by 
2
2
( )
21( )
2
w
f w e



  (4-10)
Where mean value   equals zero. The variance   can be determined by the 
NUCV value. For NUCV 3, the variance  is given by 
1
1
( ) 0.95f w dw

  (4-11)
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So,   is given by 
0.51 /m s   
4.5 Modelling Horizontal Position Uncertainty 
In the last section, aircraft’s position uncertainty has been discussed. A long 
term and short term position prediction has been introduced. By using this 
prediction method, the position uncertainty increases as time flows. However, 
this is not true in actual applications, or is not a good prediction method. In this 
section, a prediction method based on the Kalman filter is presented. 
4.5.1 Coordinate Definitions and Transformations 
The geometric position information of ADS-B reports is referenced to the WGS-
84 frame system [3]. However, trajectory tracking and prediction should be 
implemented in a local air traffic station frame, which is shown in Figure 4-6. 
Therefore, the geometric position represented in the latitude and longitude, 
should be transformed to the local frame. The transformation processes can be 
divided into two steps: firstly, aircraft position relative to WGS-84 frame is 
transformed into that relative to Earth-centred Earth-fixed (ECEF) frame; then, 
position information in ECEF frame should be transformed into that in local 
North-west Up frame. [34] 
 
Figure 4-8 Coordinate Systems 
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Positions, transformed from WGS-84 frame to ECEF frame, are shown as 
follows [34]: 
2 2
2 2
2
2 2
cos cos cos
1 (1 ) tan
sin sin cos
1 (1 ) tan
(1 )sin sin
1 sin
ECEF
ECEF
ECEF
aX h
e
aY h
e
a eZ h
e
  
  
 
  
  
 
(4-12)
Where ,   and h  are the longitude, latitude and height of aircraft (according to 
WGS-84). a  is the major axis of the Earth ellipsoid and e is its eccentricity 
(according to WGS-84). 
Transformation from ECEF frame to local North-west Up frame is given by [34]: 
sin cos sin sin cos
sin cos 0
ECEF aircraft ECEF station
LNED s s s s s
ECEF aircraft ECEF station
LNED s s
ECEF aircraft ECEF station
X X
X
Y Y
Y
Z Z
    
 
 
 
 
                                 
 
 (4-13)
Where s , s are the longitude and latitude of air traffic station (according to 
WGS-84). 
4.5.2 The Kalman Filter 
R. E. Kalman's paper describing a recursive solution of the discrete-data linear 
filtering problem was published in 1960. About this same time, advances in 
digital computer technology made it possible to consider implementing this 
recursive solution in a number of real-time applications. [40] - [42].   
Random process to be estimated can be modelled in the form  
( 1) ( ) ( ) ( )x k k x k k    (4-14)
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The observation (measurement) of the process is assumed to occur at discrete 
points in time in accordance with the linear relationship 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )z k H k x k v k   (4-15)
Where  
( )x k = (n×1) process state at time kt  
( )k = (n×n) matrix relating ( )x k to ( 1)x k   in the absence of a forcing function (if 
( )x k  is sample of continuous process, ( )k  is the usual state transition matrix) 
( )w k = (n×1) vector-assumed to be a white sequence with known covariance 
structure 
( )z k = (m×1) vector measurement at time kt  
( )H k = (m×n) matrix giving the ideal (noiseless) connection between the 
measurement and the state vector at time kt  
( )v k = (m×1) measurement error assumed to be a white sequence with known 
covariance structure having zero cross correlation with the ( )w k sequence 
The covariance matrices for the ( )w k  and ( )v k  vectors are given by 
( )
0
kT
k i
Q k i
E w w
k i
    
( )
0
kT
k i
R k i
E v v
k i
    
( ) 0Tk iE w v for all k and i  
61 
An initial estimate of the process at some point in time kt has been got, and that 
this estimate is based on all our knowledge about the process prior to kt . This 
prior estimate will be denoted as ˆ( / 1)x k k  . The estimation error is given by 
ˆ( / 1) ( / ) ( / 1)e k k x k k x k k     (4-16)
and the associated error covariance matrix is shown as follow 
ˆ ˆ ˆ( / 1) ( ( / 1) ( / 1)) [( ( ) ( / 1))( ( ) ( / 1)) ]
T T
xP k k E e k k e k k E x k x k k x k x k k          
 (4-17)
With the assumption of a prior estimate ˆ( / 1)x k k  , the measurement ( )z k is 
used to improve the prior estimate. The estimated state at the time kt  is given 
by 
ˆ ˆ ˆ( / ) ( / 1) ( )[ ( ) ( ) ( / 1)]x k k x k k K k y k H k x k k      (4-18)
Where ˆ( / )x k k  is the estimated value at time kt , and ( )K k  is Kalman filter gain. 
The associated error covariance matrix is shown as follows: 
ˆ ˆ ˆ( / ) ( ( / ) ( / )) [( ( ) ( / ))( ( ) ( / )) ]
T T
xP k k E e k k e k k E x k x k k x k x k k     
ˆ ˆ( / ) ( ( ) ( )) ( / 1)( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )
T T
x xP k k I K k H k P k k I K k H k K k R k K k      (4-19)
There is a wish to find the particular ( )K k  that minimizes the individual terms 
along the major diagonal of ˆ ( / )xP k k , because these terms represent the 
estimation error variances for the elements of the state vector. So the ( )K k  is 
given by 
1
ˆ ˆ( ) ( / 1) ( )[ ( ) ( / 1) ( ) )( )]
T T
x xK k P k k H k H k P k k H k R k
    (4-20)
Substituting equation 4-20 into equation 4-19, the estimated variance matrix is 
shown as follows: 
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ˆ ˆ( / ) [ ( ) ( )] ( / 1)x xP k k I K k H k P k k    (4-21)
The state is predicted by  
ˆ ˆ( / 1) ( / 1) ( 1/ 1)x k k k k x k k       (4-22)
Substituting equation 4-22 into equation 4-17, the ˆ ( / 1)xP k k   is denoted by 
ˆ ˆ 1( / 1) ( / 1) ( 1/ 1) ( / 1)
T
x x kP k k k k P k k k k Q           (4-23)
To sum up, the Kalman filter estimates a process by using a form of feedback 
control: the process state at a time is estimated by the filter, and then feedback 
in the form of measurements are obtained. So, the equations for the Kalman 
filter divide into two sections: time update equations and measurement update 
equations. The time update equations are used to project forward (in time) the 
current state and error covariance estimates to get the a priori estimates for the 
next time step. The measurement update equations are used for the feedback. 
The time update equations can also be considered as predictor equations, while 
the measurement update equations can be considered as corrector equations. 
Indeed a predictor-corrector algorithm is integrated in the final estimation 
algorithm for solving numerical problems, as shown below in Figure 4-9. 
 
Figure 4-9 Kalman Filter Updating 
Discrete Kalman filter time updating equations are given by 
ˆ ˆ 1
ˆ ˆ( / 1) ( / 1) ( 1/ 1)
( / 1) ( / 1) ( 1/ 1) ( / 1)Tx x k
x k k k k x k k
P k k k k P k k k k Q 
     
          
(4-24)
Discrete Kalman filter measurement update equations are shown as follows 
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1
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
( ) ( / 1) ( )[ ( ) ( / 1) ( ) )( )]
ˆ ˆ ˆ( / ) ( / 1) ( )[ ( ) ( ) ( / 1)]
( / ) [ ( ) ( )] ( / 1)
T T
x x
x x
K k P k k H k H k P k k H k R k
x k k x k k K k y k H k x k k
P k k I K k H k P k k
   
    
  
(4-25)
The matrix Q and R are the process noise covariance and measurement noise 
covariance. 
( ) ~ (0, )
( ) ~ (0, )
p w N Q
p v N R  
The standard Kalman filter is summarised in Figure 4-10. 
 
Figure 4-10 Kalman Filter Process 
The Kalman filter prediction equations are summarised as follows 
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ( 1/ ) ( 1/ ) ( / 1) ( )[ ( ) ( ) ( / 1)]
( ) ( 1/ ) ( / 1) ( )[ ( ) ( / 1) ( ) ( )]
( 1/ ) [ ( 1/ ) ( ) ( )] ( / 1) ( )
T T
x k k k k x k k K k y k H k x k k
K k k k P k k H k H k P k k H k R k
P k k k k K k H k P k k Q k

       
     
      
(4-26)
4.5.3 Aircraft Dynamic Model 
Many aircraft dynamic models have been developed [36]. To estimate state 
trajectories of a target is the main objective of aircraft tracking. An aircraft is 
usually treated as a point object without a shape in tracking, especially in 
aircraft dynamic models, although an aircraft is almost never really a point in the 
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space and the information about its orientation is valuable for tracking. An 
aircraft dynamic model or motion model describes the evolution of the aircraft 
state with respect to time.  
The aircraft dynamic model used here is constant velocity (CV) model which 
has been widely used for civil aircraft tracking [35]-[41]. Using CV model is 
reasonable for civil aircraft tracking, because civil aircraft has low dynamic 
performance, especially during the cruising phase where they usually have 
constant cruise speed. 
The aircraft’s state transition equation is given by 
( 1) ( ) ( ) ( )x k k x k k    
2 2
2 2
( 1) ( )/ 2 0 0 0 / 2 01
( 1) ( )0 0 0 0 01
( 1) ( )0 0 0 0 0 01 1
( 1) ( )0 0 0 / 2 0 / 21
( 1) ( )0 0 0 0 01
( 1) ( )0 0 0 0 0 01 1
x x
x x
y y
y y
X k X kT TT
V k V kT T
a k a k
Y k Y kT TT
V k V kT T
a k a k
                                                    
( )
( )
x
y
w k
w k
   
  
(4-27)
Table 4-2 Transition Equation Parameters Description 
Parameters Description 
X ,Y  Aircraft position along X axis and Y axis. 
xV , yV  Aircraft velocity along X axis and Y axis. 
xa , ya  Aircraft acceleration along X axis and Y axis. 
T  ADS-B updating time. 
xw , yw  Independent process noise (White Gaussian noise) because 
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of atmospheric turbulence. 
21 /
x yw w
m s    
 
According to the application of this thesis, only aircraft’s position information 
needs to be measured. Therefore, the observation model is shown as follows 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )y k H k x k v k   
( )
( )
( ) ( )( ) 1 00 0 0 0 01
( ) ( )( ) 0 10 0 0 0 01
( )
( )
x
x x
y
y
y
X k
V k
a k v kX k
Y k v kY k
V k
a k
                                 
(4-28)
Where ( )xv k  and ( )yv k  are measured noises which are White Gaussian noise. 
ADS-B information contains RNP types. According to reference [42], the 
variances of ( )xv k  and ( )yv k  are given by 
0.3
x yv v
RNP    (4-29)
4.5.4 Simulation and Discussion 
MATLAB has been used to conduct simulation work. The architecture of the 
simulation is shown in Figure 4-11. Monte Carlo method is used in the 
simulation. For a particular trajectory, the Kalman filter prediction is repeated 
100,000 times. Three functions, trajectory function, Kalman function and result 
function, are built. Firstly, an aircraft trajectory is constructed in the trajectory 
function.  Secondly, the Kalman filter prediction is implemented in the Kalman 
function. Lastly, the variance of the estimated trajectory is generated in the 
result function. 
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Figure 4-11 Simulation Architecture 
The Kalman filter prediction equations are initialized as follows. 
The initialized state matrix is given by 
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The initialized process noise matrix is given by 
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The initialized measured noise matrix is shown as follows 
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[ , ]
x yv v
R diag    
The initialized covariance matrix is denoted by 
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      , 1, 2i j   
T is position information updating time. 
Four trajectories are simulated. 
The results of the first trajectory, whose RNP type is RNP 5 and velocity 
is 2250 /m s  , are shown as follows 
 
(a) Measured and Estimated Trajectories 
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(b)  Along Tracking Variance                (b) Cross Tracking Variance 
Figure 4-12 Simulation Results with RNP 5 and Velocity 2250 /m s  
The results of the second trajectory, whose RNP type is RNP 5 and velocity is 
2220 /m s , are given by 
 
(b) Measured and Estimated Trajectories 
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(b)  Along Tracking Variance                (b) Cross Tracking Variance 
Figure 4-13 Simulation Results with RNP 5 and Velocity 2220 /m s  
The results of the third trajectory, whose RNP type is RNP 1 and velocity is 
2250 /m s , are shown as follows 
 
(c) Measured and Estimated Trajectories 
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(b)  Along Tracking Variance                (b) Cross Tracking Variance 
Figure 4-14 Simulation Results with RNP 1 and Velocity 2250 /m s  
The results of the second trajectory, whose RNP type is RNP 1 and velocity is 
2220 /m s , are given by: 
 
(d) Measured and Estimated Trajectories 
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(b)  Along Tracking Variance                (b) Cross Tracking Variance 
Figure 4-15 Simulation Results with RNP 1 and Velocity 2220 /m s  
Green lines in Figures represent reported position which is transmitted by ADS-
B, and blue lines are estimated position by using the Kalman filter. It is easy to 
see that trajectory tracking performance has been improved, because 
deviations of estimated position are smaller than that of reported position. As a 
consequence, the measured noise has been reduced. As shown in Figure 4-12 
(b)-(c), when the aircraft’s velocity is 2250 /m s and RNP type is RNP 5, the 
maximum variance of along tracking and cross tracking are 908 m and 906 m. 
In Figure 4-13 (b)-(c), when the aircraft’s velocity is 2220 /m s , the maximum 
variance of along tracking and cross tracking is 904 m and 903 m. To be 
conservative, 908 m and 906 m are selected as the variance of along tracking 
and cross tracking. Because of the reduction of noise variance, the variance of 
position distribution will be decreased. According to equation 4-1 and equation 
4-16, the variances of estimated position distribution are given by 
2.05
2.05
x
y
nmi
nmi



  
(4-30)
Compared to equation 4-9, the variance of position distribution has been 
reduced. 
When the RNP type is RNP 1, the variances of estimated position distribution 
are given by 
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0.43
0.43
x
y
nmi
nmi



  
(4-31)
4.6 Modelling Vertical Position Uncertainty 
The sensor which is used to measure flight altitude of aircraft is the barometric 
altimeter. However, the altitude information included in ADS-B information does 
not have uncertainty information. Therefore, the uncertainty of aircraft is 
modelled by zero mean Gaussian distribution, based on the historical 
observation data [43]-[44]. The uncertainty of aircraft is defined in total vertical 
error (TVE) where 
actual pressure altitude flown by an aircraft assigned altitudeTVE    
TVE contains two types of errors, which are Flight Technical Error (FTE) and 
Altimetry System Error (ASE). According to equation 4-1, the variance of TVE is 
given by 
2 2
TVE ASE FTE     
The variance of ASE density is 81.7ft, and the variance of FTE density is 39.8 ft 
[44]. Therefore, the variance of TVE density is given by 
90.9TVE ft   (4-32)
4.7 Summary 
The main object of this chapter has been to develop a method to model 
aircraft’s position uncertainty. The work of this chapter is summarized as follows 
1. Parallel air routes have been constructed. Navigation performance is RNP 5 
for en-route phase and RNP 1 for approaches phase. ADS-B system is used 
as the surveillance system and its updating time is 5 s. Communication 
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system used to transmit resolution advisory is CPDLC, and its transaction 
time is 6 s. 
2. Aircraft’s position uncertainty sources have been discussed. The uncertainty 
sources include flight technical error, display system error, path definition 
error, path steering error, and position estimation error. 
3. The Kalman filter has been used to reduce position uncertainty. Firstly, 
coordinate transformations have been made due to the application of this 
thesis. Then aircraft dynamic model and the Kalman filter have been 
introduced. Lastly, position uncertainty has been modelled in both horizontal 
and vertical planes. 
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5 Case Study and Results 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter uses a simulation to evaluate the separation minimum safety 
issues. The main purpose is to find a suitable separation minimum which can 
satisfy the safety requirement of TLS. When aircraft are separated by this 
minimum distance, the collision risk probability between two aircraft is smaller 
than TLS, which is regulated by ICAO. Section 5.2 presents the architecture of 
the simulation. The parameters, which are needed in the simulation, are 
summarized in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 discusses the results of the simulation. 
Finally, a summary is given in Section 5.5. 
5.2 Procedure of Case study 
The separation minimum evaluation procedure can be divided into four steps: 
firstly, models and parameters are developed to describe the performance of 
CNS, such as navigation accuracy, communication transaction time and 
surveillance delay time; secondly, a new method, based on the CNS 
performance parameters, is built to estimate the position of the aircraft; then the 
Reich model is used to evaluate the collision risk for the parallel air route 
separation minimum; finally, the collision risk is compared to target level of 
safety (TLS) of 
95 10 .  If the collision risk is smaller than TLS, the safety is 
guaranteed; otherwise, there will be a potential collision in the future, and a 
resolution advisory should be given. Therefore, the separation should be 
enlarged in order to ensure the safety issue. The Kalman filter software has 
been discussed in Section 4.5. 
The risk assessment procedure in lateral, longitudinal and vertical planes can 
be demonstrated by Figure 5-1. 
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Figure 5-1 Risk Assessment Procedure 
5.3 Reich Model Parameters 
Aircraft which fly in the air routes are shown in Table 5-1. These aircraft’s data 
are made based on assumption, because actual data should be based on 
historical observation data, and there is a lack of observation conditions. 
B737-700 aircraft dimensions are given in Figure 5-2 as a demonstration. 
 
Figure 5-2 B737-700 Aircraft Dimensions 
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Table 5-1 Aircraft Population Information 
Aircraft Length  x   
(ft)  
Width y      
(ft)  
Height z     
(ft) 
Cruising 
Speed 
(knots) 
B737-700 110.40 112.70 41.20 495 
A320 123.00 111.00 38.00 472 
A310 153.08 144.00 51.83 484 
A340 194.83 197.83 54.75 495 
Average 145.12 136.89 45.27 486.5 
 
Relative velocity and average number of aircraft data, which are derived from 
historical observation data, are given in Table 5-2 [43]. 
Table 5-2 Reich Model Parameters 
Parameters Value Parameters Value 
V  475 knots ( )yE same  0.2562 
V  20 knots ( )yE opp  0 
y  20 knots ( )zE same  0 
z  1.5 knots ( )zE opp  0.144 
( )xE same  0.61 xS  80 NMI 
( )xE opp  0.01   
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5.4 Separation Minimum Safety Assessment 
5.4.1 Lateral Collision Risk 
In order to assess lateral collision risk, lateral probability of overlap should be 
calculated first. In Section 4.4, aircraft’s position distribution is modelled by zero 
mean Gaussian distribution, and its variances are described in equation 4-30, 
equation 4-31 and equation 4-32. Therefore, aircraft’s position probability 
density is given by 
2
221( )
2
y
y
y
P y e 


 
Lateral probability of overlap is shown as follows 
1 2
0 0 1 1( ) ( ) (( * ( )) )
y
y
P S f y f S y T y y dy dy




 
        (5-1)
Where T is ADS-B updating time, and   is communication system transaction 
time. 
Substituting equation 5-1 and the parameters in Table 5-2 into equation 3-7, 
lateral collision risk probability is generated and shown in Figure 5-3. 
In the left side figures, y axis is the collision risk probability value, calculated 
from the Reich model, and x axis is the separation minimum value. It is easy to 
see that the collision risk probability decreases as the separation increases. For 
convenience, the y axis value is transmitted by logarithmic function, and the 
result is shown in the right side figures. The blue line represents the TLS 
of
95 10 . If the probability value is equal to or smaller than TLS, the 
corresponding value on the x axis is the separation minimum. Therefore for 
RNP 5, the separation minimum, without using the Kalman filter, is 19.4 NMI. 
However, the separation minimum by using the Kalman filter reduces to 14.8 
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NMI. For RNP 1, the separation minimum without using the Kalman filter is 4.8 
NMI, and the value decreases to 4.4 NMI by using the Kalman filter. 
 
(a) Separation Minimum With Using Kalman filter 
 
(b) Separation Minimum Without Using Kalman filter 
Figure 5-3 Lateral Collision Risk Assessment for RNP 5 
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(a) Separation Minimum With Using Kalman filter 
 
(b) Separation Minimum Without Using Kalman filter 
Figure 5-4 Lateral Collision Risk Assessment for RNP 1 
5.4.2 Longitudinal Collision Risk 
The process, used to evaluate longitudinal collision risk, is similar to the process 
to assess lateral collision risk. Aircraft’s position probability density is given by 
2
221( )
2
x
x
x
P x e 

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Longitudinal probability of overlap is shown as follows 
1 2
0 0 1 1( ) ( ) (( *( )) )
x
x
P S f x f S V T x x dx dx




 
        (5-2)
Substituting equation 5-2 and the parameters in table 5-2 into equation 3-8, 
collision risk probability is shown in Figure 5-5. 
For RNP 5, the separation minimum without using the Kalman filter is 19.4 NMI. 
However, the separation minimum by using the Kalman filter reduces to 14.8 
NMI. For RNP 1, the separation minimum without using the Kalman filter is 4.8 
NMI, and the value decreases to 4.4 NMI by using the Kalman filter. 
 
(a) Separation Minimum With Using Kalman filter 
 
(b) Separation Minimum Without Using Kalman filter 
Figure 5-5 Longitudinal Collision Risk Assessment with RNP 5 
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(a) Separation Minimum With Using Kalman filter 
 
(b) Separation Minimum Without Using Kalman filter 
Figure 5-6 Longitudinal Collision Risk Assessment with RNP 1 
5.4.3 Vertical Collision Risk 
Aircraft’s position probability density in vertical plane is given by 
2
221( )
2
z
z
z
P z e 

 
Vertical probability of overlap is shown as follow 
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1 2
0 0 1 1( ) ( ) (( *( )) )
z
z
P S f z f S z T z z dz dz




 
        (5-3)
Substituting equation 5-3 and the parameters in Table 5-2 into equation 3-9 
Vertical collision risk probability is shown in Figure 5-7. 
 
  
Figure 5-7 Vertical Collision Risk Assessment  
From Figure 5-7, it can be seen that the separation minimum is 600 feet, which 
is smaller than 1000 feet regulated by ICAO. 
The lateral, longitudinal and vertical separation minimums are summarized in 
Table 5-3 and Table 5-4. 
Table 5-3 Separation Minimum for RNP 5 
Separation Minimum Not Using Kalman Filter 
and AS-B updating time 
Using Kalman Filter and 
AS-B updating time 
Lateral 18.4 NMI 14.2 NMI 
Longitudinal 19.1 NMI 14.8 NMI 
Vertical 1000 feet 600 feet 
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Table 5-4 Separation Minimum for RNP 1 
Separation Minimum Not Using Kalman Filter 
and AS-B updating time 
Using Kalman Filter and 
AS-B updating time 
Lateral 3.82 NMI 2.74 NMI 
Longitudinal 3.9 NMI 2.89 NMI 
Vertical 1000 feet 600 feet 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter has provided a case study of separation minimum safety 
assessment issues. Lateral, longitudinal and vertical separation minimums have 
been evaluated based on safety requirements. The main points of this chapter 
are summarized as follows: 
1. Procedure of separation minimum safety assessment has been provided. 
2. Parameters used in the Reich model have been offered, based on the 
historical observation data. 
3. Separation minimum safety assessment has been carried out in horizontal 
and vertical planes. The results indicate that the paper provides a feasible 
method for safety assessment of parallel route separation minimum. 
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6 Conclusion and Future Work 
6.1 Conclusion 
Developments of the CNS systems and their effects on separation minimum 
assessment are discussed in this thesis. A Kalman filter prediction architecture, 
used to improve trajectory tracking performance, has been developed. 
Simulation results show that this architecture has a positive effect on the 
reduction of separation minimum.  
The main contributions of this thesis are summarised as follows: 
1. Performance-based CNS technologies, including RNP, RCP and RSP, are 
discussed. RNP is used to model the navigation errors as an input of the 
Kalman filter.  
2. A Kalman filter prediction architecture is developed to improve trajectory 
tracking performance. In this filter, aircraft motion is considered as a 
constant velocity model. The simulation shows that trajectory tracking 
performance has been improved. As a result, the position uncertainty has 
been reduced. 
3. Reich model is used to evaluate the collision risks in lateral, longitudinal and 
vertical planes, respectively. The results show that the method which is 
developed in the thesis can reduce separation minimum. 
6.2 Future Work 
Although, much work has been done in this thesis, further research is 
necessary in several areas. 
1. Aircraft’s motion, which is a constant velocity model in this thesis, can 
represent aircraft’s dynamics most of the time. However, when aircraft turn 
or accelerate, this model has a large bias. Therefore, a multi dynamical 
model should be developed to describe different aircraft’s motions. 
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2. The failure probability of CNS systems is not considered. In this thesis, an 
assumption that CNS systems do not fail during flight has been made, but 
this is not true. So, in the future, collision risk analysis should consider CNS 
failure modes.  
3. The data used in the Reich model is based on the historical observation data. 
It is suggested that the collision risk evaluation should be updated with new 
data. 
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APPENDIX A 
WGS-84 Parameters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
91 
APPENDIX B  
Phases of Flight 
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APPENDIX C  
1. Trajectory Function MATLAB Program. 
function [X,Y]=trajectory(T,Time,flag)  
% Generate True Trajectory[X,Y]£¬ 
% T is Update Time 
% Time is simulation time  
% flag=1 constant velocity, flag=0 acceleration 
Number=ceil(Time/T); 
flag=1; 
% initialize the position m 
x0=5000; 
y0=0; 
% aircraft velocity vx, vy m/s 
vx=250; 
vy=0; 
% accelaration ax, ay m/s*s 
ax=5; 
ay=0; 
%true trajectory 
x=zeros(Number,1);  
y=zeros(Number,1);  
%measured trajectory 
X=zeros(Number,1);  
Y=zeros(Number,1);  
% Genegrated Trajectory 
if flag==1 
        for i=1:1:Number 
            x(i)=x0+vx*i*T; 
            y(i)=y0+vy*i*T; 
        end 
end 
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else 
        for i=1:1:Number 
            x(i)=x0+vx*i*T+0.5*ax*T*T; 
            y(i)=y0+vy*i*T+0.5*ay*T*T; 
        end 
end 
% measured trajectory without measured noise 
for i=1:1:Number 
    X(i)=x(i); 
    Y(i)=y(i); 
end 
2. Kalman Filter Function MATLAB Program. 
function XE=Kalman_filter(Ts,offtime,d,Flag)  
% Kalman_filter               
% XE                        Estimated value  
% Ts                        ADS-B updating time  
% offtime                   Simulation time 
% d                         Variance of measured noise 
% Flag                      Flag=1 x axis, Flag=0 y axis  
N=ceil(offtime/Ts);  
Pv=d*d;   
% Process Noise 
sigma=1; 
% initialize the Kalman filter state 
Phi=[1,Ts;0,1];  
Gamma=[Ts*Ts/2;Ts];  
C=[1 0]; 
R=Pv;  
Q=sigma^2; 
Xest=zeros(2,1);  
Xfli=zeros(2,1);  
Pxe=zeros(2,1);  
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Px=zeros(2,1);   
XE=zeros(1,N);  
% Generate true trajectory  
[x,y]=trajectory(Ts,offtime);  
   zx(1)=x(1); 
   zy(1)=y(1); 
% Generate measured trajectory  
for i=2:N  
   vx(i)=d*randn(1); 
   vy(i)=d*randn(1);  
   zx(i)=x(i)+vx(i);  
   zy(i)=y(i)+vy(i);  
end  
% Kalman filter prediction 
switch Flag  
    case 0  
        Xfli=[zx(2) (zx(2)-zx(1))/Ts]';  
        Px=[Pv,Pv/Ts;Pv/Ts,2*Pv/Ts+Ts*Ts*Q/4];          
        K=Phi*Px*C'*inv(C*Px*C'+R);         
        for k=3:N     
        Xfli=Phi*Xfli+K*(zx(k-1)-C*Xfli);  
        K=Phi*Px*C'*inv(C*Px*C'+R); 
        Px=(Phi-K*C)*Px+Gamma*Q*Gamma';       
        XE(k)=Xfli(1,1);  
        end           
        XE(1)=zx(1);XE(2)=zx(2);   
    case 1  
        Xfli=[zy(2) (zy(2)-zy(1))/Ts]'; 
        Px=[Pv,Pv/Ts;Pv/Ts,2*Pv/Ts+Ts*Ts*Q/4];   
        K=Phi*Px*C'*inv(C*Px*C'+R);          
        for k=3:N  
        Xfli=Phi*Xfli+K*(zy(k-1)-C*Xfli); 
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        K=Phi*Px*C'*inv(C*Px*C'+R); 
        Px=(Phi-K*C)*Px+Gamma*Q*Gamma';    
        XE(k)=Xfli(1,1);     
        end  
          
        XE(1)=zy(1);XE(2)=zy(2);         
    otherwise  
        error('False iuput nargin');  
end  
3. Result Function MATLAB Program. 
%function [XER,YER]=filter_result(RNP,Ts,mon)  
% filter_result           
% Ts                    ADS-B updating time 
% mon                   Monte-Carlo repeated times  
% d                     variance of measured error  
%XER, YER estimated value  
clc;  
%position measured noise variance 
d=0.3*RNP*1852 
% Generate true trajectory 
[x,y]=trajectory(Ts,offtime);  
Pv=d*d;  
N=ceil(offtime/Ts);  
randn('state',sum(100*clock)); 
% Measured value 
for i=1:N  
   vx(i)=d*randn(1); 
   vy(i)=d*randn(1);  
   zx(i)=x(i)+vx(i); 
   zy(i)=y(i)+vy(i);  
end  
for n=1:mon  
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    % Kalman filter 
    XE=Kalman_filter(Ts,offtime,d,0);   
    YE=Kalman_filter(Ts,offtime,d,1);  
    % Variance of filter 
    XER(1:N,n)=x(1:N)-(XE(1:N))';  
    YER(1:N,n)=y(1:N)-(YE(1:N))';  
end  
for i=1:1:N 
    xstd=0; 
    ystd=0; 
    for j=1:1:mon 
        xstd=xstd+XER(i,j)*XER(i,j); 
        ystd=ystd+YER(i,j)*YER(i,j); 
    end 
    XSTD(i)=sqrt((1/mon)*xstd); 
    YSTD(i)=sqrt((1/mon)*ystd); 
end 
%plot result 
figure  
plot(x,y,'r');hold on;  
plot(zx,zy,'g');hold on;  
plot(XE,YE,'b');hold off;  
xlabel('x distance m'),grid on; 
ylabel('y distance m'),grid on; 
legend('True Trajectory','Measured Trajectory','Estimated Trajectory');  
 figure 
plot(zy,'r');hold on; 
plot(YE,'b');hold off; 
figure 
plot(XSTD)  
xlabel('T time s'),grid on; 
ylabel('X Deviation m'),grid on; 
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figure  
plot(YSTD)  
xlabel('T time s'),grid on; 
ylabel('Y Deviation m'),grid on;  
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APPENDIX D   
(Group Design Programme Main Results) 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 General Introduction 
The objective of this year’s Group Design Project (GDP) is the extension design 
from last group for a new civil transport aircraft. This aircraft, which was named 
“Flying crane”, should have the following requirements: 
 Aimed market: Regional jet airliner 
 Seating capacities: 100 ~ 130 
 Competitor: B737, A319 
 Low cost 
 Comfortable 
 Reliable 
1.2 Task Allocation 
Autonomous Traffic Collision Detection and Avoidance System (ATCDAS) 
Design  
 ATCDAS function and safety requirements, including AWAE 
 ATCDAS architecture design 
 Collision detection and avoidance algorithms 
 Software design (C or Ada) 
 ATCDAS simulation and evaluation 
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 Safety assessment 
 Integration of ATCDAS software into Net-ASS 
Terrain and Weather Surveillance Systems Design (TWSS)   
 Analyse and define function and safety requirements of terrain and 
weather surveillance systems, including AWAE 
 Integrated weather, traffic and terrain warning surveillance system 
architecture design 
 Integrated weather and terrain warning surveillance systems designs, 
such as Terrain Awareness/Warning System (TAWS) 
 Terrain detection and avoidance algorithm development  
 Simulation and evaluation of terrain detection systems 
 Evaluate system performance according to certification regulations, 
required surveillance performance 
 Safety assessment 
 Integration of terrain detection and avoidance software into Net-ASS 
1.3 Avionics System Design Process 
According to ARP (Aerospace Recommended Practice) 4754 requirement, 
system development process goes concurrently with safety assessment 
process. With the output from conceptual design, aircraft level requirements and 
FHA respectively, preliminary design starts with system level function allocation 
and FHA, then the stage goes further to system architecture and PSSA, which 
would be the input of detail design. 
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Figure 1 System Design Process 
2.  Integrated Surveillance System Design 
Surveillance is defined as the detection, tracking, characterization, and 
observation of aircraft, other vehicles, weather and airspace status information 
and phenomena for the purposes of conducting flight operations in a safe and 
efficient manner. Design of the surveillance system of flying crane based on the 
concept of integration. This new, highly integrated system combines weather 
detection, traffic alert and collision avoidance, terrain awareness and warning 
functions into a single system. 
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Figure 2 Surveillance System Architecture 
 
Figure 3 Surveillance System Data fusion Architecture 
 
3. Conflict Detection and Resolution System Design 
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3.1 Introduction 
In the early days of flying, all pilots navigated using ground features such as 
roads, rail tracks and coastlines.  
Adequate collision avoidance for aircraft has been sought for many years and 
has evolved into its present form as TCAS IV.  
TCAS has been extensively analysed, for example by the Radio Technical 
Commission for Aviation (RTCA). TCAS exchanges information using 
transponders between aircraft in danger of collision and provides resolution 
advisory information to the flight crew.  
TCAS I1 and its proposed successor TCAS IV use a simple threat detection 
zone around each aircraft and determines a manoeuvre that ensures adequate 
separation even if one of the aircraft does not manoeuvre. This provides safe 
separation even if the link to one aircraft fails. TCAS can provide for non-TCAS 
aircraft or failure in communications by negotiating sense reversals when the 
original advisories have been thwarted. 
TCAS has some limitations, which are recognised in the literature. For example, 
it has limited ability to deal with multiple aircraft and the domino effect, where 
the motion of one aircraft during avoidance affects the other aircraft in the same 
area. Ongoing work on TCAS is improving its accuracy after implementation. 
The premise of this paper is that TCAS has a major weakness in providing 
aircraft with a very late method of avoiding annihilation. Unlike the proposed 
method using ADS-B, the information obtained for each aircraft is limited and, 
thus, the ability to make informed decisions is limited. 
The RTCA recognised that advances are needed to improve collision avoidance 
as packing density increases. They recommend better use of prior knowledge 
and the need to push the event horizon further. 
3.2 TCAS 
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Traffic alert and collision avoidance system (both abbreviated as TCAS) is an 
aircraft collision avoidance system designed to reduce the incidence of mid-air 
collisions between aircraft. It monitors the airspace around an aircraft for other 
aircraft equipped with a corresponding active transponder, independent of air 
traffic control, and warns pilots of the presence of other transponder-equipped 
aircraft which may present a threat of mid-air collision (MAC). It is a type of 
airborne collision avoidance system mandated by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization to be fitted to all aircraft with a maximum take-off mass (MTOM) of 
over 5700 kg (12,586 lbs) or authorized to carry more than 19 passengers. 
 
Figure 4 TCAS Model 
3.2.1 TCAS-Ⅰ 
TCAS I is the first generation of collision avoidance technology. It is cheaper but 
less capable than the modern TCAS II system, and is mainly intended for 
general aviation use. TCAS I systems are able to monitor the traffic situation 
around a plane (to a range of about 40 miles) and offer information on the 
approximate bearing and altitude of other aircraft. It can also generate collision 
warnings in the form of a "Traffic Advisory" (TA). The TA warns the pilot that 
another aircraft is in near vicinity, announcing "traffic, traffic", but does not offer 
any suggested remedy; it is up to the pilot to decide what to do, usually with the 
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assistance of Air Traffic Control. When a threat has passed, the system 
announces "clear of conflict". 
3.2.2 TCAS-Ⅱ 
TCAS II is the second and current generation of instrument warning TCAS, 
used in the majority of commercial aviation aircraft. It offers all the benefits of 
TCAS I, but will also offer the pilot direct, vocalized instructions to avoid danger, 
known as a "Resolution Advisory" (RA). The suggestive action may be 
"corrective", suggesting the pilot change vertical speed by announcing, 
"Descend, descend", "climb, climb" or "Adjust Vertical Speed Adjust" (meaning 
reduce vertical speed). By contrast a "preventive" RA may be issued which 
simply warns the pilots not to deviate from their present vertical speed, 
announcing, "Monitor vertical speed" or "maintain vertical speed". TCAS II 
systems coordinate their resolution advisories before issuing commands to the 
pilots, so that if one aircraft is instructed to descend, the other will typically be 
told to climb - maximising the separation between the two aircraft. 
3.2.3 TCAS-Ⅲ 
TCAS III was the "next generation" of collision avoidance technology which 
underwent development by aviation companies such as Honeywell. TCAS III 
incorporated technical upgrades to the TCAS II system, and had the capability 
to offer traffic advisories and resolve traffic conflicts using horizontal as well as 
vertical manoeuvring directives to pilots. For instance, in a head-on situation, 
one aircraft might be directed, "turn right, climb" while the other would be 
directed "turn right, descend." This would act to further increase the total 
separation between aircraft, in both horizontal and vertical aspects. Horizontal 
directives would be useful in a conflict between two aircraft close to the ground 
where there may be little if any vertical manoeuvring space. All work on TCAS 
III is currently suspended and there are no plans for its implementation.  
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3.2.4 ADS-B 
An ADS-B-equipped aircraft determines its own position using a global 
navigation satellite system and periodically broadcasts this position and other 
relevant information to potential ground stations and other aircraft with ADS-B-in 
equipment. ADS-B can be used over several different data link technologies, 
including Mode-S Extended Squitter (1090 ES) operating at 1090 MHz, 
Universal Access Transceiver (978 MHz UAT), and VHF data link (VDL Mode 4). 
ADS-B provides accurate information and frequent updates to airspace users 
and controllers, and hence supports improved use of airspace, reduced 
ceiling/visibility restrictions, improved surface surveillance, and enhanced safety, 
for example through conflict management. 
Under ADS-B, an aircraft periodically broadcasts its own state vector and other 
information without knowing what other aircrafts might be receiving it, and 
without expectation of an acknowledgment or reply. ADS-B is automatic in the 
sense that no pilot or controller action is required for the information to be 
issued. It is dependent surveillance in the sense that the surveillance-type 
information so obtained depends on the suitable navigation and broadcast 
capability in the source aircraft. International aviation standards for the 
individual ADS-B data link technologies have been standardized by the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).  
 
Figure 5 ADS-B Architecture 
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Table 1 ADS-B data 
 
3.2.5 TIS-B 
TIS-B is the broadcast of traffic information to ADS-B-equipped aircraft from 
ADS-B GBTs. The source of this traffic information is derived from air traffic 
surveillance radars. TIS-B is intended to provide ADS-B-equipped aircraft with a 
more complete traffic picture in situations where not all nearby aircraft are 
equipped with ADS-B. This advisory-only application will enhance a pilot’s 
visual acquisition of other traffic. TIS-B service is becoming available in selected 
locations where there is both adequate radar surveillance coverage and 
adequate broad-cast coverage from GBTs. 
3.3 Conflict Detection and Resolution Architecture 
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Figure 6 Conflict Detection and Resolution Architecture 
3.4 Conflict Detection and Resolution Algorithm 
The algorithm generates resolution trajectories in several steps that include 
iteration loops, as seen in Fig. The input to the algorithm is data for a pair of 
aircraft that a conflict detection system predicts will lose separation within a time 
interval of interest. The time to first loss must also be provided. This time is a 
parameter of great importance to the resolution process. The time to first loss 
(TFL) is a relative time defined as the difference between the time when 
separation is predicted to be lost and the current time. TFL plays a crucial role 
in determining the priority of a conflict relative to other conflicts. It can also 
influence the resolution strategy.  
The detection system must also provide similarly detailed information for other 
conflicts (referred to as secondary conflicts) that are predicted to occur 
downstream of the primary conflict. These secondary conflicts must also be 
resolved if they will involve either of the two primary conflict aircraft and if they 
108 
occur within a specified TFL. Secondary conflicts, which occur with increased 
frequency in dense traffic, add complexity to the resolution process.  
Other inputs to the algorithm are manoeuvre constraints. These constraints, if 
they are active, specify the types of manoeuvre s that should not be used for 
resolution. Avoidance of nearby airspace boundaries, weather cells, and 
turbulence may necessitate such constraints. Another type of constraint can 
exclude one of the aircraft from being chosen as the manoeuvre aircraft such as 
a descending aircraft close to an arrival fix.  
The Resolution Aircraft and Manoeuvre Selector (RAMS) orchestrate the 
resolution process. As the first step, RAMS identifies the type of the conflict by 
matching its characteristics against a master set of all conflict types. (The types 
included in the set will be described in the next section.) Once the conflict type 
has been established, RAMS has sufficient information to select both the 
preferred manoeuvre aircraft and the preferred resolution manoeuvre . In 
addition to these preferred solutions, RAMS determines a set of alternative 
resolution manoeuvre s and associated manoeuvre aircraft. Finally, RAMS 
prioritizes these alternative sequences by assigning preference rankings to the 
alternative manoeuvre s and to the associated manoeuvre aircraft. Higher 
priority is given to those manoeuvre s that are generally known to create less 
delay, and that deviate less from the nominal flight plan trajectory or, if delay is 
not a significant factor, to those manoeuvre s that follow rules controllers would 
typically use to resolve a similar type of conflict. The set of prioritized 
manoeuvre s serves as a reservoir for choosing alternative resolutions when a 
particular preferred resolution fails to resolve a conflict, or when it is found to be 
deficient for any of several reasons described below.  
The prioritized set of resolution manoeuvre types and associated resolution 
aircraft provide the input to the Resolution Manoeuvre Generator (RMG) shown 
in Fig. RMG contains a collection of analytical formulae and heuristics for 
calculating the parameters of a simplified resolution trajectory for any 
manoeuvre type specified by RAMS. RMG also contains rules and procedures 
for choosing the coordinates of the return waypoint, which is defined as the 
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point where the resolution trajectory merges back onto the original flight plan 
trajectory. 
This point can be located far down range if no constraints are violated. The 
simplified trajectories serve as templates that provide essential input data from 
which the complete 4D resolution trajectories can be calculated.  
The next step in the resolution process is to generate the complete 4D 
trajectory that corresponds to input data provided by RMG. This function is 
performed by a complex algorithm referred to as a 4D trajectory synthesizer 
(TS). It uses detailed models of aircraft performance, operational procedures, 
and the atmosphere, including winds aloft, to generate the 4D trajectories that 
the resolution aircraft can actually fly. This process is computationally and 
logically complex, because it involves integrating point mass aircraft equations 
of motion that use models of drag and thrust adapted for each aircraft type.  
The RMG thus sends the parameters it calculates for the initially selected 
manoeuvre. 
A conflict check of the trial resolution trajectory is necessary for two reasons:  
First, to verify the trial resolution trajectory has successfully resolved the original 
(primary) conflict. Verification is necessary because the simplifications, 
approximations and rules of thumb used by the RMG can introduce significant 
differences between the trial resolution manoeuvre and the accurately 
computed 4D trajectory produced by TS. These differences can result in the 
primary conflict remaining unresolved in the trial resolution trajectory.  
Second, to rule out the possible presence of secondary conflicts (which are 
illustrated in Fig. A conflict caused by a third aircraft whose trajectory intersects 
the trajectory of the primary conflict downstream is referred to as a downstream 
secondary conflict. Downstream secondary conflicts are encountered more 
frequently as the time horizon for conflict detection or the density of traffic is 
increased. A conflict involving a fourth aircraft found along the trial resolution 
trajectory is referred to as a trial resolution secondary conflict. Trial resolution 
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secondary conflicts can arise along any trial trajectory, since each resolution is 
designed to resolve only the primary conflict.  
If the trial resolution trajectory is free of conflicts for the specified resolution time 
horizon, the algorithm promotes the trial resolution trajectory to the status of 
acceptable resolution trajectory. The ground system can now uplink this 
trajectory to the conflict aircraft and, after receiving a “will comply” message 
back from the aircraft, update the data base of currently approved 4D 
trajectories for aircraft in the resolution airspace.  
If the trial resolution trajectory is found to have conflicts within the specified 
resolution time horizon, a fault message along with appropriate diagnostic 
information is sent back to the RMG, which will pick the next-in-priority trial 
resolution manoeuvre and send it to the TS for synthesizing another trial 
trajectory. This iterative process continues until either an acceptable resolution 
trajectory is found or the reservoir of available trial resolution manoeuvre s is 
exhausted. If no resolutions are found, the RMG has additional methods to 
extend the search for resolutions as described below.  
Two parameters in the RMG are used to exercise control over the resolution 
process and to search for additional resolutions. The first parameter is the 
resolution initiation time horizon (RIH) and the second is the conflict free time 
horizon (CFH).  
The RIH is defined as the earliest time before loss of separation is predicted to 
occur when a conflict first becomes eligible for resolution. For conflicts predicted 
by the CD, to the non-preferred aircraft and the corresponding sequence of trial 
manoeuvre s are given for a few important conflict types. This table is a 
simplified representation of the logic coded into RAMS.  
An examination of the preferences listed in the second column of Table 1 
reveals that for non-arrival conflicts, altitude changes are favoured over 
horizontal and speed changes as the preferred initial choice for resolution 
manoeuvre s. This strategy is referred to as an altitude-first resolve as 
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distinguished from a horizontal-first resolve. A comparison of average delays 
obtained for these two strategies in fast-time simulations revealed a significant 
advantage in delay reduction for the altitude-first resolve. Thus, whenever 
circumstances permit and no manoeuvre constraints are violated, all feasible 
altitude manoeuvre s will be tried first for the preferred aircraft and then for the 
non-preferred aircraft before horizontal manoeuvre s are tried for either aircraft. 
Resolution strategies vary considerably among controllers, with some favouring 
horizontal and some favouring vertical resolutions. An advantage of an 
automated algorithm is the ability to implement a strategy that provides 
consistent efficiency benefits. An exception to the altitude-first rule is made for 
encounters where one of the conflict aircraft is a descending arrival. For such 
encounters, a horizontal manoeuvre referred to as a path stretch is used (this is 
explained in the next section). Finally, it should be mentioned that the software 
gives users the option of specifying either of the two strategies.  
The preferred resolution manoeuvre s used to resolve arrival vs. arrival conflicts 
converging onto a common fix were chosen to be similar to the proposed 
trajectories used to control arrival traffic onto a metering fix. The table 
distinguishes between several types of arrival vs. arrival conflicts. If both arrivals 
are in cruise, then speed changes in cruise and/or in descent are the preferred 
manoeuvre s. For these cases, the sequence order at the arrival fix helps 
determine the preferred manoeuvre aircraft. If only one aircraft is in cruise at the 
time. 
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Figure 7 Conflict Detection Theory 
3.5 Resolution  
Consider two aircraft, A and B, with known positions, flying at the same flight 
level in a uniform wind field. The aircraft airspeeds are constant and known. The 
aircraft headings and the wind field are also known, so that ground speeds and 
tracks may be calculated. Let the position vectors be rA and rB and define the 
line-of-sight (LoS) vector as 
 
If the (ground) velocity vectors of the aircraft are vA and vB, define the relative 
velocity vector as 
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Figure 8 Position and velocity geometry for a level conflict scenario 
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Resolution schemes that have one aircraft making a heading change have been 
devised. These may be preferable to providing simultaneous advisories to both 
aircraft in conflict. Refer to the expanded velocity diagram of Fig, where the 
information shown in Fig has been simplified. This diagram makes it possible to 
easily visualize a resolution performed by aircraft A, either by turning ccw 
(vector vA rotates about point C) until the relative velocity vector lines up with 
the upper dashed tangent line at point c, or turning cw until the relative velocity 
vector lines up with the lower dashed line at point e. Notice that in this example, 
A is the faster aircraft: there will be one valid solution for each tangent line. 
 
Figure 9 Heading changes for aircraft A to resolve a conflict 
The resolved heading for the faster aircraft is obtained by applying the Law of 
Sines to the new velocity triangle (either ACc or ACe). The result is 
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3.6 Simulation 
115 
3.6.1 Trajectory Tracking 
At last, in the figure, we can see that the trajectory tracking performance has 
been improved after the Kaman filter has been used. 
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Figure 10 Trajectory Tracking 
3.6.2 Conflict Simulation 
The results is shown in Fig4.7, the value of blue line is greater than the conflict 
warning threshold, so the conflict has been resolved.  
 
Figure 11 Simulation Scenarios 
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Figure 12 Horizontal Resolution Simulation Results 
4. Conclusion 
At the beginning, Airbus A320 and Boeing 737 are set as our flying crane’s 
major competitors. As for surveillance system in particular, with the study of 
these aircrafts, almost all of these functions on those two kinds of aircraft could 
be embodied in flying crane. In addition, some new concept and design such as 
integrated surveillance system are also implemented. Likewise, the design 
process is based on the compliance of airworthiness with safety assessment. 
With these fly-safe and functional features, flying crane would probably make 
itself to be one of the most serious competitors in this area. 
 
 
